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INTRODUCTION 
In March of 1991, two police squad cars pursued a suspect-
ed drunk driver speeding on a Los Angeles highway.1 At first, 
the incident seemed routine.2 But only minutes later, a video 
 
 1. The pursuit started around 12:30 AM when California Highway Patrol 
(CHP) officers first observed King’s Hyundai speeding in the northern San 
Fernando Valley in Los Angeles. Seth Mydans, Seven Minutes in Los Ange-
les—A Special Report.; Videotaped Beating by Officers Puts Full Glare on Bru-
tality Issue, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/18/ 
us/seven-minutes-los-angeles-special-report-videotaped-beating 
-officers-puts-full.html. When the CHP officers put on their emergency lights 
and sirens, King slowed but did not stop. INDEP. COMM’N ON THE L.A. POLICE 
DEP’T, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES 
POLICE DEPARTMENT 4 (1991) [hereinafter CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION 
REPORT]. An LAPD squad car—assigned to Officers Laurence Powell and Tim-
othy Ward—then joined the pursuit. Id.  
 2. At around 12:50 AM, Powell and Ward radioed in a “Code 6,” which 
signifies that a chase had come to a close. Christopher Commission Report, 
supra note 1, at 4. The LAPD Radio Transmission Operator then broadcasted 
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taken by a nearby onlooker showed four Los Angeles Police De-
partment (LAPD) officers brutally beating one of the car’s occu-
pants, a man named Rodney King, without any apparent prov-
ocation.3 The images shocked and disgusted the country.4 
Within weeks of this atrocious incident, the U.S. House Sub-
committee on Civil and Constitutional Rights convened a hear-
ing to ask two important questions5: Why do these abhorrent 
cases of misconduct continue to plague American police de-
partments? And how can the law combat this sort of wrongdo-
ing?  
Investigations by Congress and local officials in Los Ange-
les concluded that the Rodney King beating was not the result 
of a few rogue officers. It was indicative of a diseased organiza-
tional culture within the LAPD that condoned violence, tolerat-
ed racism, and failed to respond to wrongdoing.6 The Rodney 
King incident was no aberration. It was part of a pattern and 
practice of misconduct that had afflicted the LAPD for years.7 
 
a “Code 4,” a notification to all officers that no additional assistance was need-
ed at the scene of the pursuit. Id. at 5. Despite these transmissions, eleven ad-
ditional LAPD units with twenty-one officers and a helicopter appeared at the 
scene; at least twelve of the officers arrived after the Radio Transmission Op-
erator had sent out the Code 4 broadcast. Id. The Christopher Commission al-
so found that “[a] number of these officers had no convincing explanation for 
why they went to the scene after the Code 4 broadcast.” Id. 
 3. See id. at 3, 5. Amateur camera work by George Holliday caught a 
glimpse of the LAPD ruthlessly kicking and striking King “with 56 baton 
strokes.” Id. at 3. King required twenty stitches and suffered a broken cheek-
bone and right ankle. Id. at 8. Within days, video of the beating made head-
lines across the country, sparking public protests and outcry. See An ‘Aberra-
tion’ or Police Business As Usual?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1991, at E7. Chief 
Gates called the incident “an aberration.” Id. In the aftermath of these events, 
the City of Los Angeles formed an Independent Commission to formally inves-
tigate the conditions that precipitated the Rodney King incident, headed by 
Warren Christopher. Cf. CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 
vii–viii. The Christopher Commission Report found a wide range of systematic 
problems affecting the LAPD including problems with use of force, complaint 
procedures, training policies, and structural organization. See id. at 16–17. 
 4. President George H.W. Bush called the events “shocking” and ordered 
an investigation by the Department of Justice. See Mydans, supra note 1. 
 5. Police Brutality: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Civil and Consti-
tutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 133 (1991) [herein-
after Police Brutality]. 
 6. CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 17; see also id. at 
ix–x (explaining that after the City of Los Angeles investigated the use of force 
post-Rodney-King, investigators discovered that in the years leading up to the 
King beating, “183 officers had four or more allegations [of excessive force], 44 
had six or more, 16 had eight or more, and one had 16 such allegations”).  
 7. Subsequent investigations into these incidents uncovered an organiza-
tional culture that permitted gross misconduct, patterns of excessive use of 
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Federal law as it existed in 1991 was incapable of dealing with 
this sort of systemic wrongdoing. Previous attempts by the fed-
eral government to regulate police misconduct have relied on a 
host of minimally invasive methods, like evidentiary exclusion8 
and private civil litigation.9 These traditional approaches to the 
federal regulation of local police misconduct were largely inef-
fective at combating the deeply ingrained, organizational roots 
of police misconduct.10 Further complicating the regulation of 
local police misconduct, federal courts have previously held 
that both private and public litigants generally lack standing to 
 
force, a failure by the LAPD to properly discipline officers, an inability to 
properly process citizen complaints, and a failure to adopt an early warning 
system to identify problematic police officers. See CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION 
REPORT, supra note 1, at 17. In the investigation after the Rodney King inci-
dent, the Christopher Commission found that, among the officers that were 
subject to the most allegations of excessive use of force, “the performance 
evaluation reports for problem[atic] officers were very positive” as they “docu-
ment[ed] every complimentary comment received and express[ed] optimism 
about the officer’s progress in the Department.” Id. at x. After the Rodney 
King incident, the Christopher Commission found that the LAPD’s internal 
procedures for handling citizen complaints frequently led to public frustration. 
See id. at xix. Out of 2152 citizen allegations of excessive force, the LAPD only 
sustained forty-two. Once more, the commission determined that internal poli-
cies and procedures used by the LAPD’s Internal Affairs Department (IAD) 
made it hard for citizens to file complaints. Id. Years later, investigators found 
that many of the basic problems remained. MERRICK J. BOBB ET AL., FIVE 
YEARS LATER: A REPORT TO THE LOS ANGELES POLICE COMMISSION ON THE 
LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT’S IMPLEMENTATION OF INDEPENDENT 
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS 34 (1996) [hereinafter FIVE YEARS LATER 
REPORT ON LAPD], available at http://www.parc.info/client_files/Special% 
20Reports/2%20-%20Five%20Years%20Later%20%20Christopher% 
20Commission.pdf. 
 8. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655–61 (1961) (mandating 
the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment by a 
state law enforcement officer). 
 9. Civil litigants commonly bring claims against police departments un-
der 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute that provides a right of action when any state 
agent deprives a person “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 
the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). The U.S. Supreme Court 
has held that litigants can use § 1983 to hold departments and municipalities 
financially liable for the actions of individual officers under certain situations. 
See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694–701 (1978) (holding that a 
claimant under § 1983 could recover from a police department based on the 
actions of an officer if the department was deliberately indifferent in failing to 
train or supervise the officer).  
 10. See generally Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police 
Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 515–25 (2004) (describing the organi-
zational roots of police misconduct).    
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seek equitable relief against local police departments, absent 
explicit congressional authorization.11  
By 1994, Congress attempted to fill this regulatory void by 
passing a little known statute—42 U.S.C. § 14141—that gives 
the U.S. Attorney General authority to initiate structural re-
form litigation (SRL) against local police departments engaged 
in systemic misconduct.12 In practice, this means that the fed-
eral government can now use equitable relief to force problem-
atic police agencies to adopt significant structural, procedural, 
and policy reforms aimed at curbing misconduct.13  
Fast-forward two decades and many of the nation’s largest 
police departments including Los Angeles, Detroit, Seattle, Al-
buquerque, Newark, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Washington, D.C., 
and New Orleans have undergone or are currently undergoing 
this sort of SRL.14 Today, nearly one in five Americans is served 
 
 11. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105–10 (1983) (conclud-
ing that, since a § 1983 litigant was not likely to experience future harm, he 
did not have standing to seek injunctive relief against the Los Angeles Police 
Department to prevent use of a chokehold); United States v. City of Philadel-
phia, 644 F.2d 187, 206 (1980) (finding, in part, that the DOJ cannot seek eq-
uitable relief against a police department without statutory authorization).  
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (1994). Congress passed this statute as part of the 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (VCCLEA). Pub. L. 
No. 103–322, 108 Stat. 1796. The statute makes it unlawful for a police agency 
to engage in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct, § 14141(a), 
and gives the Attorney General the authority to seek injunctive or equitable 
relief to force police agencies to implement reforms aimed at curbing miscon-
duct, § 14141(b). 
 13. Unlike other traditional methods of police regulation, SRL allows the 
courts to oversee the restructuring of policies and procedures within a police 
department to prevent future misconduct. In other contexts, like prisons and 
schools, courts have successfully used SRL to “generat[e] change in public in-
stitutions.” Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Po-
licing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 11 (2009). The statute states that “[i]t shall 
be unlawful for any governmental authority, or any agent thereof . . . to en-
gage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement” and provides that 
“[w]henever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that [such] 
a violation . . . has occurred, the Attorney General . . . may in a civil action ob-
tain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or 
practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 14141. 
 14. Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 3189, 3244–47 (2014) (showing a list of all cities that have undergone 
SRL thus far). Other major cities like Oakland and New York also have been 
subject to structural reform mandates at the hands of federal courts, but these 
were via § 1983, not § 14141. See generally J. David Goodman, Bloomberg 
Calls Court Monitor for Police a ‘Terrible Idea,’ N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/14/nyregion/bloomberg-calls-court-monitor 
-for-police-a-terrible-idea.html (discussing New York’s stop-and-frisk policy); 
Joseph Goldstein, Judge Rejects New York’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, N.Y. TIMES 
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by a law enforcement agency that has been subject to a De-
partment of Justice (DOJ) investigation via § 14141.15 This 
statute is an important development in the history of American 
policing law.16 But at the time that Congress passed this meas-
ure in 1994, few noticed. The media all but ignored this law’s 
passage.17 Even today, very little academic research has ana-
lyzed the implementation of this statute.18 This is particularly 
surprising since scholars in a wide range of disciplinary fields 
have long grappled with the question of how the law can pre-
vent misconduct in local police departments. The existent liter-
ature has spent considerable time discussing the effectiveness 
of other regulatory mechanisms in combating police wrongdo-
ing.19 But across academic disciplines, legal scholars, sociolo-
 
(Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/nyregion/stop-and-frisk 
-practice-violated-rights-judge-rules.html (providing details about the New 
York case regarding this policy).  
 15. This number was calculated by adding up the population served for 
each law enforcement agency listed as previously or currently under investiga-
tion by the DOJ pursuant to § 14141. See Rushin, supra note 14, at 3244–47 
(listing in Appendix A all police agencies that have been subject to a formal 
DOJ investigation via § 14141 since 1994). Using the United States Census 
population estimates for 2012 as the baseline for population, this total approx-
imates 56,017,310. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE 2012 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1–
77 (2012), http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/12statab/pop.pdf. By dividing 
the total number of citizens living in jurisdictions served by a department sub-
ject to a § 14141 case by the total U.S. population (estimated at 313,900,000), 
around 18% of Americans are served by a police agency that has been subject 
to a § 14141 investigation. Cf. id. 
 16. See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 798–99 (2006); see also Armacost, supra note 10, at 457 
(stating that § 14141 is “perhaps the most promising legal mechanism” for re-
ducing police misconduct). 
 17. One way to understand just how little attention § 14141 received at 
the time of passage is to look at the number of media mentions about the stat-
ute in the New York Times in 1994 and 1995. During this period, the New 
York Times made no mention of the passage of this law, despite spending con-
siderable time discussing other components of the VCCLEA. See Stephen 
Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments 64–67 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) (on file 
with author) (showing the number of media mentions and words spent dis-
cussing various components of the VCCLEA). There was also virtually no 
mention of the measure in the congressional record. Despite this lack of men-
tion, there is some indirect legislative history connected to a previous attempt 
to pass a similar measure in 1991. Cf. Rushin, supra note 14, at 3207–08. 
 18. See infra Part I.C (discussing the scope of the available literature on 
SRL).  
 19. See infra Part I.A (detailing some of the previous research on the tra-
ditional approach to police regulation).  
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gists, and criminologists have inadequately studied the DOJ’s 
implementation of SRL pursuant to § 14141.20   
Drawing on original interviews, court documents, statisti-
cal data, and media reports, this Article describes the SRL pro-
cess and theorizes on its effectiveness. It argues that SRL can 
facilitate organizational change in law enforcement agencies. 
SRL forces local governments to prioritize investments into po-
lice reform, even if such investments are not politically popu-
lar.21 It utilizes external monitoring to ensure that frontline of-
ficers substantively comply with top-down mandates.22 And it 
provides police executives with legal cover to implement wide-
ranging policy and procedural reforms aimed at curbing mis-
conduct.23 Evidence also suggests that SRL may help reduce a 
police department’s civil liability, thereby potentially paying for 
itself long-term.24  
But SRL in police departments is far from perfect. Success-
ful SRL requires continual support from municipal leaders, 
dedication by executives within the targeted agency, and buy-in 
by frontline officers.25 This suggests that SRL alone is insuffi-
cient to transform a law enforcement agency. The process is al-
so expensive.26 The vast majority of this financial burden falls 
 
 20. See infra Part I.C (showing the limited amount of existing empirical 
research on SRL).  
 21. See infra Part IV.A (showing the LAPD as an example of how SRL 
contributes to a reallocation of municipal resources towards police reform).  
 22. See infra Part IV.B.  
 23. As explained infra Part IV.C, this is particularly important since col-
lective bargaining statutes make it difficult for police chiefs to implement sig-
nificant misconduct regulations. See COLLEEN KADLECK & LAWRENCE F. 
TRAVIS, III, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, POLICE DEPARTMENT AND POLICE 
OFFICER ASSOCIATION LEADERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF COMMUNITY POLICING: 
DESCRIBING THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF AGREEMENT 3–4 (2004), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/226315.pdf (noting that “several re-
searchers have described union resistance to specific policy changes,” includ-
ing professionalization attempts, civilian review boards, promotion proce-
dures, organizational changes, lateral entry policies, disciplinary procedures, 
recruitment procedures, overtime provisions, one officer cars, and changes in 
departmental directives).  
 24. See infra Part IV.D (showing reduction in Los Angeles liability after 
SRL); Telephone Interview with City Official and External Monitor #20 (Sept. 
5, 2013) [hereinafter Interview #20] (stating that in Detroit, “the amount of 
money that we have saved on lawsuits that we had endured for years, particu-
larly for deaths in our holding cells, have paid for the cost of implementation 
of the monitoring 2 or 3 times”). 
 25. See infra Part V.D.  
 26. See infra Part V.A (showing how SRL cost the LAPD over $100 mil-
lion).  
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on local police agencies over a relatively short period of time.27 
This raises concerns about the feasibility of SRL in poorer 
communities.28 Additional questions remain about whether tar-
geted agencies will sustain reforms after federal intervention 
ends,29 and whether SRL reduces officer aggressiveness, there-
by contributing to higher crime rates.30 
 
 27. See infra Figure 5 (showing that the SRL process has lasted between 
five and approximately twelve years, depending on the affected police agency).  
 28. Infra Figure 5. This concern is particularly salient because of the ex-
treme decentralization in American law enforcement that contributes to wide 
resource disparities between municipalities. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008, at 2 
(2011), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf (putting 
the number of state and local law enforcement agencies at 17,985); 
PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE 
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 91 (1967) [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S 
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT], available at https://www.ncjrs 
.gov/pdffiles1/nij/42.pdf (highlighting how spending for urban departments 
was found to be around $27.31 per resident per year, while spending in small-
er departments was only $8.74 per resident per year). 
 29 . See infra Part V.B (describing sustainability concerns in municipali-
ties like Pittsburgh).  
 30. See, e.g., ROBERT C. DAVIS ET AL., CAN FEDERAL INTERVENTION BRING 
LASTING IMPROVEMENT IN LOCAL POLICING? THE PITTSBURGH CONSENT 
DECREE 16 (2005), available at http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/ 
resources/downloads/277_530.pdf (stating that after the beginning of SRL, po-
lice officers in Pittsburgh felt “hesitant to intervene in situations involving 
conflict because they were afraid of having a citizen file an unwarranted 
anonymous complaint against them”); Damien Gayle, Shootings Up 13% in 
New York City After Federal Judge Rules Police ‘Stop and Frisk’ Tactics Un-
constitutional and Racist, DAILY MAIL (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www 
.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2425055/Shootings-10-New-York-City-federal 
-judge-rules-stop-search-unconstitutional-racist.html (detailing how New York 
City officials pointed to a thirteen percent increase in shootings over twenty-
eight days as evidence that the Judge’s orders have contributed to higher 
crime); Colleen Long, NYC Stop-and-Frisk Policy Wrongly Targeted Minorities, 
Judge Rules; Outside Monitor Appointed, STAR TRIB. (Aug. 12, 2013), http:// 
www.startribune.com/219252341.html (identifying Mayor Bloomberg as a 
strong critic of a federal district court decision to overhaul New York City Po-
lice Department’s stop-and-frisk program, and citing Bloomberg’s concern that 
the law will hurt crime fighting efforts); Michael Howard Saul, Bloomberg 
Calls Stop-and-Frisk Ruling “Dangerous,” WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2013), http:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323585604579009191911601838 
(quoting further Mayor Bloomberg, criticizing overhauling stop-and-frisk in 
part because of the court’s failure to understand the streets of the city); Dan 
Springer, Seattle Facing Rift Between Police and Politicians Over Jump in 
Crime, Open Pot Smoking, FOX NEWS (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.foxnews 
.com/politics/2013/12/10/seattle-facing-rift-between-police-and-politicians-over 
-jump-in-crime-open-pot (stating that in Seattle, a city currently under federal 
monitorship as part of SRL, “police have been accused of de-policing”); Joshua 
M. Chanin, Negotiated Justice? The Legal, Administrative, and Policy Impli-
cations of ‘Pattern or Practice’ Police Misconduct Reform 185 (2011) (un-
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This Article concludes by showing how the lessons from 
SRL can inform future legal regulations of law enforcement. 
The apparent success of SRL showcases the importance of spec-
ificity in police regulations and the need for external accounta-
bility.31 It also demonstrates the need for more data collection 
on the behavior of frontline officers.32 Combined, these sorts of 
reforms could harness the lessons from SRL to regulate local 
law enforcement more effectively. 
I.  EMERGENCE OF STRUCTURAL REFORM LITIGATION 
IN POLICE DEPARTMENTS   
 Federal policymakers did not come to view local police mis-
conduct as a pervasive, national epidemic until the Wicker-
sham Commission Report revealed the scope of the problem in 
1931.33 Since then, the most prominent federal regulations of 
 
published manuscript), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/ 
237957.pdf (quoting the head of Washington, D.C.’s police union that federal 
oversight has led to more paperwork, thereby taking away time that could be 
spent fighting crime). 
 31. See infra Part VI.  
 32. Infra Part VI. 
 33. See, e.g., RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN 
JUSTICE 70 (2008) (“[T]he Wickersham Commission Report revealed that po-
lice brutality in general and the third degree in particular were practiced ex-
tensively and systematically in police departments across the country.”). For a 
full record of the Wickersham Commission Report sections involving local po-
lice misconduct, including the Report on Lawlessness, see Samuel Walker, 
Records of the Committee on Official Lawlessness, in RECORDS OF THE 
WICKERSHAM COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, at v–vi 
(1997), available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/academic/upa_cis/ 
1965_wickershamcommpt1.pdf. In 1929, President Herbert Hoover appointed 
the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement. Id. at v. 
George W. Wickersham, who served as the U.S. Attorney General under Pres-
ident William Howard Taft, chaired the commission. Id. Prominent legal 
scholars and policymakers also sat on the commission, including Harvard Law 
School Dean Roscoe Pound and former U.S. Secretary of War Newton D. 
Baker. Id. In total, the Wickersham Commission issued fourteen reports on a 
wide range of criminal justice issues. See id. These reports were unique in part 
because they represented objective, technocratic approaches to understanding 
the problems plaguing the criminal justice system. See id. at vi. In 1931, the 
Wickersham Commission published the Report on Lawlessness in Law En-
forcement, which some policing scholars have called “one of the most important 
events in the history of American policing.” Id. at v. While many of the Com-
mission’s reports had little immediate effect on public policy, the Report on 
Lawlessness in Law Enforcement did motivate major changes in policing poli-
cy. Id. at vii. The report claimed “in uncompromising language” that police at 
the time regularly used physical brutality and cruelty during interrogations to 
obtain involuntary confessions. Id. at ix. Through a combination of participant 
and observation evidence, the report made a strong case for major reform in 
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law enforcement have come via decisions handed down by the 
United States Supreme Court, which use the weapon of eviden-
tiary exclusion to discourage certain police practices. Federal 
law also permits private litigants to bring civil suits against 
state actors that violate their constitutional rights. And federal 
law makes it a criminal offense for local law enforcement to vio-
late a person’s constitutional rights. These traditional regula-
tions operate as “cost-raising mechanisms.”34 That is to say, 
these traditional approaches attempt to dissuade police wrong-
doing by raising the potential costs of such behavior. They can-
not force police departments to adopt proactive reforms aimed 
at curbing misconduct.  
 While these cost-raising mechanisms almost certainly have 
had some statistically significant effect on police wrongdoing, 
they are ill equipped to combat the organizational roots of po-
lice wrongdoing. The Rodney King beating brought national at-
tention to the inadequacies of this traditional regulatory ap-
proach. In the years that followed, Congress responded by 
quietly passing 42 U.S.C. § 14141 to fill this regulatory void.  
 
American police departments. While reform was not immediate, the Supreme 
Court did take a small step toward the judicial regulation of law enforcement 
the following year in Powell v. Alabama—the first case in which the Court re-
versed a conviction on the basis of a criminal procedure violation. See Powell v. 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Walter Pollak, one of the consultants who au-
thored the Report on Lawlessness, argued the case before the Court. Walker, 
supra, at ix–x. The justices in the Miranda decision cited the Wickersham 
Commission Report multiple times in explaining the long, documented history 
of police brutality and misconduct during interrogations. Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 445 n.5, 447–48 (1966) (citing the Wickersham Commission Re-
port as part of the evidence for abusive interrogation styles used at the time). 
It is also worth noting that American law enforcement is extremely decentral-
ized. Virtually all police officers serve at the local level. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, 
THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE: NEW YORK’S LESSONS FOR URBAN CRIME AND 
ITS CONTROL 102 (2012) (explaining that the historical dedication to “localism” 
in law enforcement has created a “decentralization [in American policing] that 
often resemble[s] fragmentation”). 
 34. See Rushin, supra note 14, at 3196. For example, imagine a city facing 
a major crime epidemic concludes that by encouraging officers to execute un-
justified Terry stops, the city can reduce crime. Id. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1 (1968). This sort of behavior may expose the city to civil litigation 
and evidentiary exclusion. Rushin, supra note 14, at 3196. However, if the city 
concludes that this sort of cost is worth the potential benefit of reduced crime 
through deterrence, then it is free to continue the behavior under the tradi-
tional approach to federal regulation of police misconduct. Id. at 3197. Some 
might argue this is exactly what has happened in New York City. See Gold-
stein, supra note 14 (explaining the court decision that held that New York 
City acted unconstitutionally in executing racially disparate Terry stops).  
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A. HISTORICAL ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE POLICE MISCONDUCT 
Historically, the federal government has never acted as 
“the front line troops in combating . . . police abuse.”35 Instead, 
the federal government has relied on a handful of less invasive 
measures designed to incentivize reform in police departments. 
First, the Court has barred the admission of some evidence ob-
tained by police officers in violation of the Constitution.36 The 
Court designed this so-called exclusionary rule to eliminate the 
incentive for police to engage in unconstitutional misconduct.37 
Critics, though, have pointed out that the exclusionary rule is 
full of exceptions that limit its usefulness.38 The empirical evi-
dence is split on whether or not the exclusionary rule actually 
results in police departments changing internal policies to pre-
vent misconduct.39 Critics also sharply criticize the exclusionary 
 
 35. Police Brutality, supra note 5, at 3 (statement of John R. Dunne, As-
sistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice).  
 36. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (extending the exclu-
sionary rule to cover wrongdoing by state-level law enforcement); Wolf v. Colo-
rado, 338 U.S. 25, 26–33 (1949) (declining to extend the exclusionary rule to 
state police); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 390–92 
(1920) (expanding the exclusionary rule to cover not just illegally obtained ma-
terial, but also copies of illegally obtained material—the precursor to the “fruit 
of the poisonous tree” doctrine); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 
(1914) (establishing the exclusionary rule, but only applying the rule to actions 
by federal law enforcement).   
 37. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (stating that the 
purpose of the exclusionary rule “is to deter—to compel respect for the consti-
tutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the in-
centive to disregard it”).  
 38. See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2504–27 
(1996) (chronicling the Supreme Court’s gradual recognition of numerous ex-
ceptions to the exclusionary rule); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 
924–25 (1984) (permitting prosecutors to submit evidence obtained illegally so 
long as the illegality was in good faith by law enforcement); Nix v. Williams, 
467 U.S. 431, 449–50 (1984) (allowing law enforcement to use unlawfully ob-
tained evidence so long as the police would have inevitably discovered that 
same evidence through another legal investigatory method); Elkins, 364 U.S. 
at 208–33 (describing the silver platter doctrine which allowed federal law en-
forcement to use evidence unlawfully obtained by state police); Stephen 
Rushin, The Regulation of Private Police, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 159, 183 (2012) 
(detailing how the exclusionary rule only applies to public law enforcement). 
 39. See, e.g., William C. Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the 
Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance with 
the Law, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 311, 335 (1991) (arguing that the exclu-
sionary rule may actually impact a police department’s likelihood of adopting 
proactive reforms); Myron W. Orfield, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: 
An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016, 
1017 (1987) (similarly finding that the Chicago Police Department did respond 
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rule for allowing potentially guilty suspects to go free.40 As a re-
sult, some critics worry that the exclusionary rule may contrib-
ute to higher crime rates.41  
Second, private litigants can bring suit under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 against state agents, like police officers, who violate 
their constitutional rights.42 The Court has also carved out a 
narrow avenue for private litigants to hold an entire police de-
partment or municipality liable for the actions of an individual 
officer.43 In theory, civil litigation ought to incentivize police 
departments to make proactive reforms in order to avoid costly 
judgments. The empirical evidence on the effectiveness of pri-
vate civil litigation, though, is mixed. Professor Charles Epp 
has shown that when the Court opened up police departments 
to civil liability in the late 1970s, some insurance companies 
opted to no longer provide liability protections for police de-
partments, citing the unacceptably high risk.44 This led to some 
 
to the exclusionary rule by making internal policy and cultural changes). But 
cf. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? 322 (2d ed. 2008) (rejecting the role of courts in instigating 
social change in various contexts, including in the exclusionary rule). 
 40. See, e.g., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE EFFECTS 
OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: A STUDY IN CALIFORNIA 10 (1982), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/87888NCJRS.pdf (finding that the 
use of the exclusionary rule led to prosecutors dropping complaints in 86,033 
felony arrest cases); More Criminals To Go Free? Effect of High Court’s Ruling, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 27, 1966, at 32, 33 (quoting the mayor of the 
city of Los Angeles as saying the Miranda decision would contribute to more 
criminals going free). 
 41. See, e.g., LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 248 (1983) 
(citing Nixon’s campaign speeches criticizing Miranda as a decision that will 
increase crime); Raymond A. Atkins & Paul H. Rubin, Effects of Criminal Pro-
cedure on Crime Rates: Mapping Out the Consequences of the Exclusionary 
Rule, 46 J.L. & ECON. 157, 159 (2003) (finding that the exclusionary rule’s 
passage was associated with a uptick in national crime); Paul G. Cassell & 
Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miran-
da’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1127–36 
(1998). 
 42. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (establishing a statutory right for private liti-
gants to bring civil suits against state agents that violate their privileges or 
immunities). 
 43. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 700–01 
(1978) (establishing that a § 1983 claimant may recover civil penalties from a 
department based on the actions of an officer employed at that department). 
 44. CHARLES R. EPP, MAKING RIGHTS REAL: ACTIVISTS, BUREAUCRATS, 
AND THE CREATION OF THE LEGALISTIC STATE 95 (2009) (explaining that 
around this time “[t]he primary police liability insurance company, pointing to 
concerns about rising legal liability, had pulled out of the market”). 
RUSHIN_4FMT 4/7/2015  5:27 PM 
2015] STRUCTURAL REFORM LITIGATION 1355 
 
departments making proactive reforms.45 Conversely, Professor 
Samuel Walker argues that civil litigation is an ineffective way 
to incentivize police reform. This is in part because of the or-
ganization of local government—“one agency of government, 
the police department, commits abuses of rights, another agen-
cy, the city attorney’s office, defends the conduct in court, and a 
third agency, the city treasurer, pays whatever financial set-
tlement results from the litigation.”46 In addition, a recent 
study by Professor Joanna Schwartz claims that virtually all 
police departments indemnify individual police officers.47 And 
in the end, civil litigation cannot force a police department to 
adopt costly reforms. Since it is a cost-raising mechanism, it 
can only raise the cost of some types of misconduct, with the 
hope that a rational police department will respond with proac-
tive policy changes. 
Third, federal prosecutors can also bring criminal charges 
against police officers when their conduct constitutes a crime.48 
Limited resources, though, prevented federal prosecutors from 
regularly using this authority in the years leading up to the 
passage of § 14141.49 Once more, only a small subset of uncon-
stitutional police behavior is actually criminal.50  
Other tools against police misconduct include the develop-
ment of citizen review boards51 and accreditation.52 These forms 
 
 45. Id. at 4, 95–96 (arguing that the resultant reform made by police de-
partments were something Epp calls “legalized accountability”).  
 46. Samuel Walker & Morgan Macdonald, An Alternative Remedy for Po-
lice Misconduct: A Model State “Pattern or Practice” Statute, 19 GEO. MASON 
U. C.R. L.J. 479, 495 (2009). 
 47. Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 
890 (2014). 
 48. See Armacost, supra note 10, at 464–65 (citing criminal culpability as 
a mechanism for holding law enforcement accountable for misconduct); 
Rushin, supra note 14, at 3202–03 (explaining the use of criminal culpability 
as a mechanism to prevent misconduct). 
 49. Rushin, supra note 14, at 3203 fig.1 (showing that one percent or less 
of all complaints of police misconduct resulted in charges being filed by federal 
prosecutors under § 242).  
 50. Debra Livingston, Police Reform and The Department of Justice: An 
Essay on Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815, 842 n.138 (1999) 
(“[C]riminal law standards define ‘the outer limits of what is permissible in 
society’—not the good police practices that police reformers aspire to institute 
in a wayward department . . . .” (quoting PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE KNIFE 
101 (1995))).  
 51. See James R. Hudson, Police Review Boards and Police Accountability, 
36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS 515, 518 (1971) (explaining how advocates push-
ing for civil review boards portrayed them as necessary since police were “not 
perceived as impartial, neutral enforcers of the law, particularly by the citi-
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of police reform, though, are voluntary as opposed to mandato-
ry.53 Since these traditional approaches to the federal regula-
tion of local police departments have relied on cost-raising 
mechanisms, policymakers have generally let state-level police 
agencies run autonomously.54 Innovation and change within 
departments happened through local experimentation and vol-
untary coordination with other police agencies.55 No one—not 
the courts, private litigants, nor the federal government—has 
generally forced police departments to adopt specific policies.  
B. RODNEY KING AND THE NEED FOR AN EQUITABLE REMEDY 
While SRL was an option in a variety of other institutional 
contexts, at the time of the Rodney King beating, multiple fed-
eral court rulings had barred private and public litigants from 
seeking equitable relief against police departments. In Los An-
geles v. Lyons, a private citizen sued the LAPD for using a dan-
gerous chokehold.56 As part of the suit, the plaintiff attempted 
to enjoin the LAPD from using the tactic in the future.57 In a 5-
4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the private plain-
tiff did not have standing to enjoin any police practices because 
he could not show any continuing or future threat from the tac-
tic.58  
 
zens of ghetto neighborhoods.”); see generally SAMUEL WALKER & BETSY 
WRIGHT, CITIZEN REVIEW OF THE POLICE, 1994: A NATIONAL SURVEY (1995), 
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=155242 
(describing the adoption of citizen review boards). 
 52. Rushin, supra note 14, at 3204 (discussing the rise of voluntary ac-
creditation of municipal police departments as a way to expand the use of best 
practices).  
 53. Id. at 3204 n.88 (describing how only 5.6% of police agencies were sub-
ject to voluntary accreditation by 2010).  
 54. See id. at 3241 (describing a need for state and national policymakers 
to become more involved in police reform). 
 55. ZIMRING, supra note 33, at 103 (stating that in the past, police de-
partments exclusively looked inward for tactical innovation and remained 
“hermetically sealed . . . impervious to outside influences”).  
 56. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 97–98 (1983). 
 57. Id. at 95–100.   
 58. Id. at 102–05 (identifying “immediately in danger of sustaining some 
direct injury” as the standard and finding that this standard is not met in this 
case); see also Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: 
Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1384, 1386 (2000) (“In the aftermath of Lyons, meaningful enforcement of 
[civil] rights . . . —at least so far as injunctive relief is concerned—[was] left 
solely to the government.”).  
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Around the same time, the federal government attempted 
to use equitable relief against a police department. The DOJ 
noticed a high number of civil rights complaints against the 
Philadelphia Police Department.59 In response, the DOJ opened 
an eight-month investigation into this apparent pattern of un-
constitutional conduct.60 Thereafter, the DOJ brought federal 
suit against Philadelphia, seeking to enjoin certain unconstitu-
tional behaviors.61 The Third Circuit found that the DOJ had no 
standing to seek equitable relief against a local police depart-
ment without a specific statutory mandate from Congress.62 
After the Lyons and City of Philadelphia cases, neither 
private nor public litigants had an equitable remedy against a 
local police agency except for a few narrow cases.63 This re-
mained an accepted part of policing law until the early 1990s 
when the Rodney King beating shocked the nation and sparked 
a national debate on how to best address police misconduct.64 
The incident vividly illustrated the inadequacies of traditional 
measures to fight police misconduct and bolstered the case for 
an equitable remedy.65 In 1991, in response to mounting evi-
dence linking the Rodney King beating to organizational poli-
cies and procedures in the LAPD, several members of Congress 
proposed the Police Accountability Act, a measure that that 
would have authorized both public and private litigants to ini-
tiate SRL.66 This measure initially failed.67 Three years later, 
 
 59. Police Brutality, supra note 5, at 172 (statement of Drew S. Days, Pro-
fessor of Law, Yale Law School) (“[W]e identified the city of Philadelphia as 
being very high upon the list of those communities where we had complaints of 
police misconduct.”).  
 60. Id. at 173 (explaining that “[i]t was a very intense investigation in-
cluding the use of a special squad of FBI agents, data specialists, computer 
experts, to look into the allegations that we had uncovered”).  
 61. See id. (detailing how the DOJ filed suit for injunctive relief but failed 
because of the lack of an explicit grant of power from Congress).  
 62. See United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d. 187, 206 (1980). 
 63. See Harmon, supra note 13, at 12 (“Prior to § 14141, no statute other 
than § 1983 authorized suits for equitable relief against police departments for 
officer misconduct, and it remains the case that no other statute authorizes 
private equitable suits.”). 
 64. Rushin, supra note 14, at 3209–15 (describing in detail the importance 
of the Rodney King beating to the national debate that spurred § 14141).  
 65. Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder 
Collaboration in the Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 507 (2008) (discussing committee meetings in 
which representatives identified the “serious and outdated gap in the federal 
scheme for protecting constitutional rights” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 102-242, at 
138 (1991))). 
 66. Gilles, supra note 58, at 1403.  
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Congress finally passed § 14141, which authorizes the Attorney 
General, but not private litigants, to instigate SRL.68 Although 
less extensive than the proposed Police Accountability Act, this 
new right to publicly initiated SRL was still a monumentally 
important development in the history of police accountability.  
C. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
At the time that Congress passed § 14141, several scholars 
were hopeful that SRL could serve as an important tool to fight 
deeply rooted police misconduct.69 Some scholars theorized that 
SRL would facilitate the transformation of organizational cul-
ture.70 Others believed that SRL would empower the executive 
branch to craft “precisely frame[d]” policy reforms tailored to 
the “unique facts and situation[s] that gave rise to the problem” 
in a specific jurisdiction, rather than “one-size-fits-all” solu-
tions.71  
Nevertheless, despite these theorized benefits of SRL, 
there is a dearth of empirical research on the subject within the 
legal academy. A few legal academics have written provocative 
normative pieces that outline possible ways to improve the SRL 
process.72 For example, Professor Rachel Harmon has theorized 
on how the DOJ could change its selection process to incentiv-
ize more police departments to reform proactively.73 Professor 
 
 67. Terence Moran & Daniel Klaidman, Police Brutality Poses Quandary 
for Justice Dep’t, LEGAL TIMES, May 4, 1992, at 1 (explaining how the DOJ 
under George H.W. Bush and police advocacy groups strongly opposed the in-
clusion of any such individual right of action, eventually contributing to the 
measure’s failure). 
 68. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-322, § 210401, 108 Stat. 1796, 2071–72. 
 69. See Stuntz, supra note 16, at 798 (calling SRL one of the most im-
portant developments in criminal procedure since the exclusionary rule); see 
also Armacost, supra note 10, at 457 (calling SRL “perhaps the most promising 
mechanism” for preventing police wrongdoing). 
 70. Armacost, supra note 10, at 527 (discussing how police misconduct is 
linked to organizational culture and then saying that “[a]ll of this suggests 
that injunctive relief . . . is especially suited to addressing the systemic causes 
of police brutality”). 
 71. Id. at 525–26.  
 72. See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 58, at 1403 (suggesting that Congress 
should permit the DOJ to deputize private citizens to bring § 14141 actions, 
thereby inducing more reform); Harmon, supra note 13, at 27–30 (arguing that 
the DOJ ought to develop an enforcement policy that incentivizes police de-
partments to reform proactively); Simmons, supra note 65, at 518–19 (arguing 
for measures to increase collaboration during federal reforms). 
 73. See Harmon, supra note 13, at 4. 
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Kami Chavis Simmons has written on the importance of includ-
ing community stakeholders in the negotiation and implemen-
tation of settlement agreements pursuant to § 14141.74 Profes-
sor Samuel Walker and Morgan MacDonald have recommended 
that states adopt their own versions of § 14141.75 Professor 
Debra Livingston has analyzed the earliest negotiated settle-
ments in Steubenville and Pittsburgh.76 Professor Myriam 
Gilles has argued that, in light of the DOJ’s limited enforce-
ment ability, Congress ought to amend § 14141 to allow the 
DOJ to deputize private citizens to bring public pattern or 
practice suits against police departments seeking injunctive re-
lief.77 And Professor Mary D. Fan has argued that the “off-the-
books” nature of SRL “may yield smarter and farther-reaching 
reforms and remedies based on data-driven surveillance” of lo-
cal police by the federal government.78 Overall, the existing le-
gal scholarship on § 14141 has provided numerous compelling 
normative recommendations. But the existing legal scholarship 
in this area has not developed a thorough account of how SRL 
works from beginning to end. By understanding how the SRL 
process works, legal scholars can make more effective norma-
tive recommendations to improve the implementation of the 
statute.  
Outside of the legal academy, there have been three signif-
icant studies assessing the outcomes of SRL. All three have 
found SRL to be effective at reducing misconduct. In the first of 
these studies, the Vera Institute of Justice concluded that the 
use of SRL in Pittsburgh led to a long-lasting reduction in ap-
parent misconduct.79 The introduction of SRL in Pittsburgh cor-
 
 74. See Simmons, supra note 65, at 494. 
 75. See Walker & Macdonald, supra note 46, at 481–82. 
 76. See generally Livingston, supra note 50, at 815. 
 77. See generally Gilles, supra note 58, at 1386. 
 78. Mary D. Fan, Panopticism for Police: Structural Reform Bargaining 
and Police Regulation by Data-Driven Surveillance, 87 WASH. L. REV. 93, 93 
(2012).   
 79. DAVIS ET AL., supra note 30, at 1–2. The Vera report found that the 
reforms implemented as part of the consent decree remained in effect after the 
monitors departed. There, researchers surveyed over a hundred frontline offic-
ers, conducted focus groups, interviewed key officials, reviewed monitor re-
ports, surveyed citizenry, and analyzed police statistics. Id. at 5–6. The Vera 
evaluation states that “the officers clearly indicated—as had the command 
staff—that the accountability mechanisms remained intact after the lifting of 
the decree.” Id. at 17. 
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related with a reduction in use of force,80 improvements in the 
percent of resolved complaints,81 the development of an inspec-
tion team that identified any deficiencies in policy implementa-
tion.82  
According to surveys, around 61% of Pittsburgh officers be-
lieved that the SRL era ushered in either minor or significant 
changes in the department.83 Around 54% of officers believed 
that SRL increased accountability in the department.84 The 
overwhelming number of community residents surveyed in 
Pittsburgh believed that federal intervention was necessary to 
improve the municipality’s police agency,85 with nearly all re-
spondents saying that their impression of the Pittsburgh police 
had either stayed the same or improved during the SRL era.86   
A second study, completed by the RAND Corporation, 
found that after monitoring, the Cincinnati Police Department 
in 2009 was “not the same as the department that policed Cin-
cinnati in 2001” thanks to “[p]olicy changes, oversight, and a 
variety of reforms.”87 The RAND study analyzed vehicle stops 
for evidence of racial profiling, investigated trends in police ag-
gressiveness, and conducted surveys of community and officer 
satisfaction.88 It found that Cincinnati residents believed that 
policing improved during the consent decree.89 External reviews 
 
 80. Id. at 10 fig.2 (showing the progressive reduction in use of force by the 
Pittsburgh Bureau of Police).   
 81. Id. at 32 figs. 12 & 13 (showing an increase in resolved and cleared 
complaints).  
 82. Id. at 12–15 (describing the role of this inspection team).  
 83. Id. at 20 fig.5 (showing officer responses to the survey question, “Did 
programs introduced under the decree change how officers interact with citi-
zens?”).  
 84. Id. at 21 fig.6 (showing officer responses to the survey question, “Did 
new programs introduced under the decree increase accountability of offic-
ers?”).  
 85. ROBERT C. DAVIS ET AL., TURNING NECESSITY INTO VIRTUE: 
PITTSBURGH’S EXPERIENCE WITH A FEDERAL CONSENT DECREE 35 (2002), 
available at http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/ 
Pittsburgh_consent_decree.pdf (stating that 84% of both white and black re-
spondents said the decree was necessary to improve the quality of policing).  
 86. Id. at 38 (showing that 86% felt that the Pittsburgh police had either 
improved or stayed the same during the decree years).  
 87. GREG RIDGEWAY ET AL., POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN 
CINCINNATI, at xxx (2009), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/ 
pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG853.pdf.   
 88. See generally id.  
 89. Id. at 89 (explaining, for example, that black respondents reported 
higher satisfaction with the Cincinnati Police in 2008 than in 2005).  
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of videotaped interactions between Cincinnati police officers 
and citizens found that while some apparent racial inequalities 
remained, the overall body of evidence showed improvement.90 
And statistical investigations of vehicle stop data suggested 
that the Cincinnati Police Division substantially improved 
recordkeeping during the SRL era.91  
In the third existing study, Professors Christopher Stone, 
Todd Foglesong, and Christine Cole determined that federal in-
tervention contributed to a substantial decline in apparent mis-
conduct in the LAPD.92 SRL in Los Angeles correlated with im-
proved community opinions of the LAPD.93 The proportion of 
residents who believed that the LAPD offered “good” or “excel-
lent” services increased from around 48% in 2005 to about 61% 
in 2009.94 Similarly, the percentage of individuals who said that 
the LAPD treated them fairly “almost always” or “most of the 
time” increased from about 39% in 2005 to 51% in 2009.95 Stone 
et al. also found that the LAPD reduced categorical uses of 
 
 90. Id. at 68 (“Thus, while we find evidence of CPD improvement over 
time, both in its record keeping and in the quality of its interaction with the 
public, there are still racial inequalities that are likely to undermine police-
community relations.”).  
 91. Id. at 30.  
 92. CHRISTOPHER STONE ET AL., POLICING LOS ANGELES UNDER A 
CONSENT DECREE: THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE AT THE LAPD (2009), available 
at http://www.assets.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/Harvard-LAPD%20Study.pdf 
(showing generally how the LAPD consent decree appeared to be successful in 
bringing about more constitutional policing). These researchers undertook 
hours of participant observation, analyzed administrative data on crime, ar-
rests, traffic or pedestrian stops, use of force, and personnel. In addition, they 
conducted surveys of the police officers, detainees, and residents of Los Ange-
les. Id. at i–ii. 
 93. Id. at 11, 44–51 (explaining that the survey involved 1,503 respond-
ents via telephone and 1,636 respondents online, and also detailing the results 
of these surveys). 
 94. Id. at 44 fig.29. 
 95. Id. at 50 fig.33. But not all communities in Los Angeles were equally 
satisfied with the LAPD. Black and Latino respondents reported less satisfac-
tion with the LAPD than White and Asian residents. Id. (showing that only 
around 40% of Black respondents and 48% of Latino respondents reported be-
ing treated fairly by the LAPD most of the time or almost all of the time). 
Nevertheless, even Black and Latino respondents reported an increase in per-
ceived fairness and satisfaction during the structural reform era. Id. And the 
vast majority of Black and Latino residents were somewhat or very hopeful 
about the trend in effectiveness and integrity in the LAPD as of 2009. Id. at 46 
fig.32 (showing that about 85% of Black respondents and 88% of Latino re-
spondents claimed to be very hopeful or somewhat hopeful about the trend in 
the LAPD going forward). Overall, while some racial disparities continue to 
exist in public opinion, community satisfaction rose substantially during the 
SRL era, as did optimism about the future of the department. 
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force during SRL, defined as any serious uses of force like the 
use of a firearm, head strikes, dog bites, or other injuries that 
require hospitalization.96 Categorical uses of force per officer 
decreased by 34% over the time period, and categorical uses of 
force per arrest fell by 33% between 2001 and 2010 in the 
LAPD.97 This suggests that the LAPD was less likely to use cat-
egorical force as the SRL progressed. Of course, it is easy to im-
agine a set of police behaviors that do not result in a categorical 
use of force, but still demonstrate systemic misconduct. For in-
stance, a pervasive pattern of Terry stops that target minority 
men, like those found in New York City involve no categorical 
use of force.98 Categorical use of force statistics might not cap-
ture this type of minor, regularized misconduct. To measure 
this type of minor misconduct, the Stone et al. study used data 
on the proportion of pedestrian and traffic stops that result in 
an arrest. As Stone et al. argued, “[w]hen stops increase greatly 
without an increase in the number that lead to arrests, the pat-
tern suggests that police suspicions are being aroused too easily 
 
 96. Id. at 32–35 (describing categorical use of force and showing the trend 
in the use of this type of force). 
 97. The Stone et al. study only used data from 2004 to 2009. See STONE ET 
AL., supra note 92. But data from additional years is available. See L.A. 
POLICE DEP’T, 2010 USE OF FORCE ANNUAL REPORT 10, available at http:// 
www.assets.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/2010YearEndReport.pdf (listing the to-
tal incidents of categorical use of force from 2007 to 2010); L.A. POLICE DEP’T, 
2009 USE OF FORCE ANNUAL REPORT 15, available at http://www.assets 
.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/2009YearEndReportFinal.pdf (listing the total inci-
dents of categorical use of force from 2006 to 2009); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR 
GEN., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT REGARDING CATEGORICAL USES OF FORCE 2, 
available at http://www.assets.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/010609_BPC09-0008 
.pdf (listing the number of categorical use of force incidents from 2003 to 
2007); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., 2005 ANNUAL REPORT REGARDING 
CATEGORICAL USES OF FORCE 2, available at http://www.oiglapd.org/ 
Reports/2005%20CUOF_Rept.pdf (showing the categorical uses of force from 
2001 to 2005). For data on the number of officers in the LAPD, see Uniform 
Crime Reports, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/cjis/ucr/ucr-publications (click on requisite year under “Crime in the United 
States,” then click on “Police Employee Data,” “Table 78,” and navigate to the 
data for Los Angeles, California) (last visited Mar. 7, 2015). Using this addi-
tional data, categorical uses of force fell from 117 to 85 between 2001 and 
2010—a drop of 27.3%. Categorical uses of force per arrest fell from 0.0008361 
to 0.0005623. Categorical uses of force per officer fell from 0.01308 to 0.00862 
(data on file with author). 
 98. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that a police officer could 
perform a stop of a limited time and scope if he or she had reasonable suspi-
cion that a person was engaged in a criminal act); Stop and Frisk Data, N.Y. 
C.L. UNION, http://www.nyclu.org/content/stop-and-frisk-data (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2015) (giving a detailed breakdown of the seemingly racially disparate 
pattern of stop-and-frisks in New York City). 
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and the decision to interfere with people’s liberty is being made 
too lightly, even if the stops are constitutionally justifiable in 
each individual instance.”99 Conversely, when a higher percent-
age of stops result in arrest, this suggests that, “police officers 
stopped people for good reasons and were willing to have the 
District Attorney scrutinize those reasons.”100  
In 2002, only around 16% of pedestrian stops and 3% of 
vehicle stops ended in an arrest; by 2008, these numbers had 
increased to 34% and 6% respectively.101 Among those arrested, 
the rate at which prosecutors levied charges actually in-
creased.102 According to Stone et al., this suggests that not only 
did LAPD officers arrest more individuals after stops, but that 
increasingly, the prosecutor agreed with these arrest decisions. 
This is consistent with a police department that is more judi-
ciously using its authority to stop pedestrians and motorists.103 
There is also compelling statistical evidence that the LAPD 
made substantial progress in improving its management of 
gang units,104 handling of persons with mental illnesses,105 poli-
cies on confidential informants,106 and broader training pro-
grams.107  
 
 99. STONE ET AL., supra note 92, at 24. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. fig.15. 
 102. Id. at 30. Stone, Foglesong, and Cole used filing rate as a measure of 
the “quality” of police decisions to make an arrest. In theory, if the rate at 
which prosecutors bring charges against those arrested by the LAPD in-
creased, then the LAPD is likely making better arrest decisions. Conversely, if 
the prosecutor is choosing to bring fewer charges per arrest, then we might 
suspect that the LAPD is making a higher proportion of unjustified arrests. 
Stone et al. show that, “[f]or Part One arrests, the felony filing rate increased 
while both the release rate and misdemeanor filing rate fell. For Part Two ar-
rests, the felony filing rate increased, the misdemeanor filing rate fell, and the 
release rate remained steady, at 14 percent.” Id. at 31.  
 103. This is also not consistent with the type of potential police abuse iden-
tified in New York, where massive increases in low-level arrests did not trans-
late into higher percentages of misdemeanor convictions. See, e.g., Issa Kohler-
Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 
611, 611 (2014).   
 104. OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR OF THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T, FINAL 
REPORT 76–83 (2009) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT FOR LAPD]; see also id. at 77 
(stating that, although early on the LAPD struggled with the gang unit re-
quirements, the “[d]epartment has made substantial strides towards a better 
trained and supervised gang unit”).  
 105 . Id. at 89–93; see also id. at 93 (claiming that the LAPD has made 
“significant advances” in this area and now “continues to be in the national 
forefront of this important policing issue”).  
 106. Id. at 84–88; see also id. at 85 (“The Department released a Confiden-
tial Informant Manual in 2002 that incorporated all of the requirements of the 
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While these three empirical studies provide strong evi-
dence that SRL correlates with a reduction in misconduct, the-
se studies also suffer from a significant limitation. The studies 
offer little explanation of how and why SRL achieves these im-
pressive results. This is in part because the existing literature 
offers a relatively thin conception of how the SRL process 
works from beginning to end. This gap in the literature is un-
derstandable, given the largely extrajudicial character of SRL. 
In theory, § 14141 gives the DOJ the authority to file suit 
against any local police department engaged in a pattern or 
practice of misconduct. But in practice, the DOJ prefers to work 
with departments outside of the confines of the formal court 
system, in the shadow of the law.108 The DOJ typically identi-
fies problematic agencies, initiates investigations, and negoti-
ates settlements largely without help from the courts. As a re-
sult, most of the SRL process happens behind closed doors. This 
Article attempts to fill these gaps in the literature by develop-
ing a thorough, descriptive account of this extrajudicial police 
reform process.   
II.  METHODOLOGY   
This Article addresses two gaps in the existing literature 
on SRL in police departments. First, this Article uses empirical 
methods to build a descriptive account of how the SRL process 
works from beginning to end in American police departments. 
This Article focuses specifically on the most common form of 
SRL in police departments—SRL initiated by the DOJ pursu-
ant to § 14141.109 Second, this Article theorizes on the benefits 
and limitations of this regulatory mechanism.  
Since much of the SRL process pursuant to § 14141 occurs 
extrajudicially, this study relies on in-depth interviews with 
 
Consent Decree.”).  
 107. Id. at 93–100; see also id. at 94 (“The LAPD has been tremendously 
successful in its effort to improve its training function.”).  
 108. Fan, supra note 78, at 116–20 (discussing how the DOJ has seemingly 
negotiated reforms and completed substantial structural reforms in the shad-
ow of law, without relying heavily on the formal legal system).  
 109. Structural reform litigation initiated by private litigants is rare, given 
that few litigants can show that they are likely to be affected by police miscon-
duct in the future. This means that few litigants can overcome the Lyons 
standing barrier. While there have been a few recent examples of private 
structural reform litigation in police departments—namely in Oakland, New 
York, and Maricopa County—this study is limited to structural reform litiga-
tion initiated by the DOJ pursuant to § 14141.  
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stakeholders in the SRL process.110 To identify relevant stake-
holders, I used court documents, monitor reports, and other 
public information to identify the name and contact infor-
mation for a population of seventy-four individuals that have 
played a substantial role in the implementation of SRL in po-
lice departments since the passage of § 14141. These stake-
holders fall into three different categories: DOJ litigators, ex-
ternal monitors, and police officials.111 This study did not 
attempt to interview frontline police officers, since past studies 
have already surveyed these officers about their impressions of 
SRL.  
I sent interview requests to all seventy-four stakeholders. I 
received a 47% response rate, resulting in thirty-five in-depth 
interviews. These interview participants generally requested 
anonymity, given their continued work in this field. This sam-
ple of thirty-five stakeholders included at least two stakehold-
ers from all ongoing or completed § 14141 SRL cases. To facili-
tate each interview, I used three interview scripts—one for 
monitors, one for DOJ litigators, and one for law enforcement 
professionals.112 These scripts asked questions about each par-
ticipant’s role in § 14141 cases. These scripts also asked partic-
 
 110. Qualitative studies commonly use semi-structured interviews. See, 
e.g., Avlana Eisenberg, Expressive Enforcement, 61 UCLA L. REV. 858, 919 
(2014); Keith Guzik, The Agencies of Abuse: Intimate Abusers’ Experience of 
Presumptive Arrest and Prosecution, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 111, 115 (2008); 
Helen B. Marrow, Immigrant Bureaucratic Incorporation: The Dual Roles of 
Professional Missions and Government Policies, 74 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 
756, 759 (2009); David Orzechowicz, Privileged Emotion Managers: The Case 
of Actors, 71 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 143, 145 (2008). During semi-structured inter-
views, a researcher will commonly ask a participant a set of pre-planned ques-
tions. The researcher will also commonly ask unplanned follow-up questions 
that help the researcher gain a more detailed understanding of the partici-
pant’s responses. See Eisenberg, supra, at 919. The sample size used in this 
study should be sufficiently large and broad to provide a representative look at 
the SRL process. This is because the field of individuals involved in the SRL 
process is surprisingly small. Few departments have undergone full-scale 
SRL. Only a small number of litigators have actually handled § 14141 cases at 
the DOJ. And only a handful of companies have served as external monitors in 
the existent § 14141 cases.   
 111. In total, eight of the interview participants had significant experience 
at the DOJ handling § 14141 cases, fifteen had experience as law enforcement 
officials in affected municipalities, and fourteen had experience as monitors in 
previous or ongoing SRL cases. Some participants had experience in two of 
these categories.  
 112. I developed these interview scripts by conducting a preliminary, ex-
ploratory interview with one monitor, one DOJ litigator, and one law enforce-
ment executive. I also reviewed court documents, monitor reports, and the ex-
isting literature to develop this interview script.  
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ipants to describe each step in the SRL process to the best of 
their ability. And these scripts inquired about specific tensions 
that arise during this sort of SRL. I used these scripts to guide 
semi-structured interviews. When participants had experience 
in two or more of these categories—for example, when an inter-
view participant had been both a DOJ litigator handling 
§ 14141 cases and had worked on an external monitoring 
team—I asked the participant questions from both scripts. I 
recorded and transcribed all interviews when possible. I then 
coded these transcripts to identify common themes in the par-
ticipants’ responses. The participants gave remarkably con-
sistent answers. I note any time that interview participants 
gave inconsistent responses.  
These interviews were particularly useful in addressing 
the first research question posed by this Article—that is, in 
piecing together a descriptive account of each stage of SRL in 
police departments pursuant to § 14141. Interview participants 
offered consistent answers in describing how this extrajudicial 
police reform process worked. This Article supplements these 
interview responses with additional data drawn from court 
documents, media reports, and departmental records to provide 
a thorough description of the SRL process. Identifying the ben-
efits and limitations of SRL as a regulatory mechanism is more 
challenging. Doing so raises tough causal questions. For exam-
ple, what parts of SRL contribute to the mechanism’s apparent 
success in reducing misconduct? And what components of SRL 
unnecessarily burden law enforcement? In addressing these 
questions, this Article does not purport to make any definitive, 
causal claims. Instead, this study uses interview data to engage 
in theory building. This Article also uses additional statistical 
data to provide support for these hypothesized benefits and lim-
itations. More research will be needed, though, to fully validate 
the hypotheses reached in this Article.  
III.  THE STRUCTURAL REFORM LITIGATION PROCESS 
IN POLICE DEPARTMENTS   
SRL in police departments is a long and complex process. It 
is easiest to understand the SRL process by first taking a mac-
ro-view of each step. Figure 1 demonstrates the progressive 
stages of SRL.  
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FIGURE 1. STAGES OF STRUCTURAL REFORM LITIGATION 
 
Stage 1: Case Selection
Stage 2: Preliminary Inquiry
Stage 3: Formal Investigation
Stage 4: Settlement Negotiations
Stage 5: Appointment of Monitor 
Stage 6: Monitored Reform 
 
A. CASE SELECTION, PRELIMINARY INQUIRY, AND FORMAL 
INVESTIGATION 
The first step in the SRL process is case selection. In this 
stage, the DOJ has the responsibility of identifying police agen-
cies that may be engaged in a pattern or practice of misconduct. 
Of course, there are around 18,000 police agencies in the Unit-
ed States that potentially fall under the regulatory purview of 
§ 14141.113 And the federal government collects no uniform sta-
tistics on police misconduct. How, then, should a small team of 
lawyers in Washington, D.C. identify which of these local and 
state agencies is engaged in a pattern of unconstitutional mis-
conduct?  
When Congress first passed SRL in 1994,114 the DOJ was 
given no guidance on how to identify which police agencies 
were engaged in a pattern or practice of misconduct.115 The re-
sponses by interview participants provide some insight into 
this case selection process. The DOJ relies on a wide array of 
methods to identify problematic police departments. First, the 
DOJ relies on media reports to identify problematic depart-
ments.116 As one DOJ litigator explained, “if the media brought 
 
 113. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND 
LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 2 (2011), available at http://www.bjs 
.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf (putting the number of state and local law 
enforcement agencies at 17,985). 
 114. See supra note 12 (discussing passage of SRL in 1994). 
 115. See Rushin, supra note 14, at 3239 (describing the ambiguous man-
date given to DOJ). 
 116. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Dep’t of Justice Participant #18, at 
4 (Aug. 8, 2013) [hereinafter Interview #18] (transcript on file with author) 
(stating that the DOJ identified cases “through a mix of media reviews [and] 
newspaper reviews”). One former DOJ litigator also explained that 
“[o]ccasionally [inquiries] get started when there is a big expos[é] of a big prob-
lem in a department . . . .” Telephone Interview with Department of Justice 
Participant #14, at 4 (July 11, 2013) [hereinafter Interview #14] (transcript on 
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attention [to or] shed light on allegations . . . in a credible and 
repeated fashion” then the DOJ may give that city a closer 
look.117 Second, the DOJ sometimes harnesses existing litiga-
tion as a springboard into SRL.118 This can involve coordination 
with existing civil rights activists or organizations already 
pursing claims against police agencies.119 Third, whistleblowers 
within police agencies can alert the DOJ about possible mis-
conduct.120 Sometimes these whistleblowers are front-line police 
officers, while other times these whistleblowers are top admin-
istrators within the department.121 Fourth, academic studies 
 
file with author). Cases that fall into this category include Los Angeles, Wash-
ington, D.C., and Cincinnati. See Telephone Interview with Department of 
Justice Participant #12, at 3–4 (July 30, 2013) [hereinafter Interview #12] 
(transcript on file with author); Telephone Interview with External Monitor 
#13, at 5 (Aug. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Interview #13] (transcript on file with au-
thor). 
 117. Interview #12, supra note 116, at 4. This participant continued by giv-
ing an example: “I think the Washington Post actually did an expos[é] on the 
shootings,” which in part motivated the focus on the Metropolitan Police De-
partment. Id. at 2.  
 118. Existing litigation appears to be a motivating factor for the DOJ’s in-
volvement in Steubenville, Pittsburgh, and Columbus. Rushin, supra note 14, 
at 3219–20. The Steubenville case is a particularly useful example of this case 
selection method. There, Ohio attorney James McNamara “used to litigate 
against Steubenville all the time.” Interview #14, supra note 116, at 4. As a 
former DOJ litigator explained, McNamara “filed a Monell count” that “went 
through 50 or 60” examples of misconduct by the Steubenville Police Depart-
ment. Id. Afterwards, McNamara sent the file to the DOJ who used this as a 
basis to start a formal investigation into the Steubenville Police Department. 
Id.  
 119. Interview #14, supra note 116, at 7 (explaining the role that the 
NAACP and the ACLU served in early investigations in cities like Pittsburgh). 
These sorts of organizations can bring a police department’s misconduct to the 
attention of the DOJ through “persistent efforts by lawyers and civil rights 
advocates . . . flood[ing] the Justice Department with complaints” that provide 
the basis for a formal investigation. Nicole Marshall, Why Investigate Us? Po-
lice Ask, TULSA WORLD (Apr. 1, 2001), http://www.tulsaworld.com/ 
archives/why-investigate-us-police-ask/article_519a9c8d-2e3e-5696-9aae 
-6147c6569141.html. 
 120. Interview #12, supra note 116, at 2 (“[S]ometimes there were internal 
whistle blowers.”). It is worth noting that this Article cannot give too many 
specific examples of whistleblowers who have initiated SRL, as the DOJ “pro-
tect[s] the identity of whistleblowers [meaning litigators] aren’t able to talk 
more about it.” Id. at 4. But, as the litigator concluded, “in a handful of cases, 
we relied heavily on files and information given to us by officers inside a de-
partment.” Id. This is in part because whistleblowers “could speak from the 
inside about . . . the actual policies and procedures and practices” better than 
outsiders. Id. 
 121. An interesting example of a front-line officer acting as a whistleblower 
came when a former DOJ litigator described talking “to a number of African 
American officers in some of the cities that I worked in who told me about 
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can help the DOJ identify problematic departments.122 These 
studies are sometimes sufficiently rigorous to give the DOJ a 
running start as it builds a case against a police agency.123 
Fifth, even though § 14141 is designed to target systematic 
misconduct, other units within the DOJ sometimes forwards 
particularly egregious single incidents of misconduct that may 
be a symptom of broader organizational and cultural deficien-
cies.124 There is no simple formula for identifying problematic 
police departments.125  
 
their experiences when they were out of uniform [and] [h]ow they and their 
sons or fathers or uncles were treated.” Id. at 4. Other times, the whistleblow-
er is a police executive. POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, CIVIL RIGHTS 
INVESTIGATIONS OF LOCAL POLICE: LESSONS LEARNED 2 (2013) [hereinafter 
PERF], available at http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_ 
Series/civil%20rights%20investigations%20of%20local% 
20police%20-%20lessons%20learned%202013.pdf (discussing how Chief 
“Charles Ramsey . . . asked the Justice Department to intervene after a series 
of articles . . . alleged that [his] officers shot and killed more people per capita 
. . . than any other large U.S. city”).  
 122. The DOJ’s investigation and eventual settlement with the New Jersey 
State Police typifies this selection method. Interview #12, supra note 116, at 
1–2 (giving an overview of how the DOJ became interested in the New Jersey 
State police and explaining that “[t]here were maybe tens of years of problems 
reported by minority drivers on the Turnpike in New Jersey and lots of civil 
litigation and lots of allegations of abuse and D[O]J used the pattern or prac-
tice authority to bring the first racial profiling case under that statute”). As a 
former litigator detailed, in New Jersey’s case, the DOJ “had some academic 
work on the subject suggesting racial profiling was happening.” Id. at 1.  
 123. The rigorous study done on racial profiling by the New Jersey State 
Police, written by John Lamberth, is a useful example. Lamberth “systemati-
cally evaluated whether the New Jersey State Police appeared to be targeting 
drivers of color on state highways.” Rushin, supra note 14, at 3222. 
Lamberth’s work found very strong evidence that Black drivers were stopped 
disproportionately compared to the amount of Black drivers engaged in traffic 
crimes. Id. These “findings were central to a March 1996 ruling by Judge Rob-
ert E. Francis of the Superior Court of New Jersey that the state police were 
de facto targeting blacks, in violation of their rights under the U.S. and New 
Jersey Constitutions,” and useful to the DOJ as it mounted a case against the 
New Jersey State Police. Id. at 3222–23 (quoting John Lamberth, Driving 
While Black: A Statistician Proves That Prejudice Still Rules the Road, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 16, 1998, at C1).  
 124. Interview #18, supra note 116, at 2 (citing the Timothy Thomas shoot-
ing as an example of a particularly egregious incident of misconduct that mo-
tivated DOJ action). This litigator went on to explain the process by which the 
Criminal Section may come across a particularly jarring misconduct incident 
and determine that it may be caused by underlying policies and cultures with-
in the department. In such cases, they will forward the case file for possible 
§ 14141 investigation. Id. at 4–5.  
 125. See Interview #14, supra note 116, at 4 (explaining the case identifica-
tion process “varies [a] good deal” from one case to the next).  
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While this approach to case selection gives the DOJ wide 
authority, it also understandably frustrates police depart-
ments.126  
Once a DOJ litigator has chosen a police agency for review, 
the department enters the preliminary inquiry stage.127 During 
this period, a litigator will complete an internal and confiden-
tial review of publicly available data, examine news reports, 
and interview residents of the community.128 Between January 
1, 2000, and September 1, 2013, the DOJ initiated around 325 
preliminary inquiries, or about 25–26 per year.129 If there ap-
pears to be sufficient evidence that the agency is engaged in a 
pattern or practice of misconduct, the DOJ will officially open a 
formal investigation.130 Opening a formal investigation is a ma-
jor step. Only about 12% of preliminary inquiries turn into for-
mal investigations.131 After the DOJ opens a formal investiga-
tion, the DOJ’s interest in the police department becomes 
public knowledge.132 Investigations are expensive and time-
 
 126. See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Low Profile in Big-City Police Probes Is 
Under Fire; Law: Critics Say Justice Dep’t Boldly Pursues Misconduct Cases in 
Smaller Towns but Goes Slower on Larger Inquiries, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 
2000, at A1 (quoting Gary Dufour, former City Manager of Steubenville, Ohio, 
who questioned why the DOJ chose Steubenville: “You see all these problems 
that have come up at the police departments in Los Angeles and New York 
and New Orleans, and you’ve got to wonder, why us?”).  
 127. Rushin, supra note 14, at 3224–26 (explaining the preliminary inquiry 
process as the stage when a litigator spends a few hours researching media 
reports and publicly available data for evidence of misconduct); see also Over-
sight of the Department of Justice—Civil Rights Division: Hearing Before the 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 18–20 (2002) [hereinafter Oversight of 
DOJ] (testimony of Ralph Boyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights 
Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice) (using the same label for this phase).  
 128. Oversight of DOJ, supra note 127, at 18–19 (stating that during this 
preliminary inquiry phase, the DOJ relies on public information like witness 
interviews, pleadings, and testimony in court). 
 129. Rushin, supra note 14, at 3226; see also Telephone Interview with De-
partment of Justice Participant #5, at 2 (Sept. 4, 2013) [hereinafter Interview 
#5] (on file with author) (identifying how preliminary inquiries turn into in-
vestigations if there is sufficient evidence to support the possibility of system-
atic misconduct). 
 130. See Interview #5, supra note 129 (providing this number from internal 
DOJ records).  
 131. Rushin, supra note 14, at 3226 (showing that between January 2000 
and September 2013, the DOJ opened 325 preliminary inquiries that turned 
into 38 formal investigations—meaning that about 11.6% of inquiries turn to 
investigations).  
 132. Interview #14, supra note 116, at 4 (explaining that investigations are 
the point at which the inquiry becomes public and noting that “[o]pening an 
investigation is a huge deal. It’s a very big moment. You wouldn't want to do 
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consuming—sometimes costing millions of dollars133 and taking 
several months or even years to complete.134 In carrying out an 
investigation, the DOJ takes an “inventory of departmental pol-
icies and procedures related to training, discipline, routine po-
lice activities, and uses of force, and conducts in-depth inter-
views to determine whether the department’s practices adhere 
to formal policies.”135 In total, the DOJ has initiated fifty-five 
formal investigations, or around three per year.136 During inter-
views, DOJ litigators reiterated that resource limitations pre-
vent the Special Litigation Section from initiating as many 
formal investigations as they believe to be necessary.137 Politics 
also play a role in the DOJ’s willingness to utilize § 14141.138 




that if there turns out not to be enough there to investigate”). 
 133. Jodi Nirode et al., City, Justice Department Draft Pact; The Police Un-
ion Will Be Asked To OK Contract Changes To Avoid a Suit Over, COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH, Aug. 17, 1999, at A1 (stating that the DOJ requested $100 million 
in its 2000 budget, to fund sixteen new investigators, suggesting that the cost 
of investigation is often high). 
 134. See Jamie Stockwell, Rights Investigation of Police Continues; Pace of 
Pr. George’s Inquiry Angers Some, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2002, at C6 (stating 
that the average investigation “can take years as investigators wade through 
piles of internal records and personnel files”). 
 135. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, PROTECTING CIVIL RIGHTS: A 
LEADERSHIP GUIDE FOR STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 8 
(2006), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/ric/Publications/e06064100 
.pdf. Litigators from the DOJ do not do these investigations by themselves; 
instead, they outsource much of the work to police experts and professionals. 
Id.  
 136. Rushin, supra note 14, at 3232 (showing that across most Administra-
tions the total number has generally sat around three investigations per cal-
endar year). 
 137. Interview #5, supra note 129, at 1 (“But I can tell you for starters that 
there are far more agencies that . . . have some sort of a problem of constitu-
tional dimensions than we would ever get to.”).  
 138. Rushin, supra note 14, at 3233 fig.4 (showing that the total number of 
open cases declined significantly during the second half of the Bush Admin-
istration and providing qualitative evidence tying this decline to changes in 
internal policies).  
 139. Id. at 3233. 
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As the data in Figure 2 demonstrates, the volume of SRL 
cases fell during the second Bush Administration. Interviewees 
attribute this decline to a variety of changes in the internal pol-
icies of the DOJ that discouraged the use of federal oversight in 
reforming local state agencies.140 Combined, this evidence sug-
gests that public initiated rights of action like § 14141 are inev-
itably susceptible to political influences, potentially limiting 
their usefulness.  
After this resource-intensive investigation, the DOJ makes 
a determination about whether or not the police agency is en-
gaged in a pattern or practice of misconduct. In theory, if the 
DOJ finds such evidence of systematic wrongdoing, it could file 
suit against the local police agency and eventually bring the 
claim to trial. In practice, though, this has never happened. In-
stead, the DOJ has reached a settlement with every depart-
ment identified as in violation of § 14141. These settlements 
happen after a period of settlement negotiations.  
B. SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS 
After the DOJ has completed its internal investigatory 
phases, SRL advances to the negotiation stage. During this 
phase, the DOJ spends anywhere from a few months to a few 
years negotiating over the types of reforms that a police agency 
ought to make to avoid full-scale litigation under § 14141.141 
 
 140. See id. (describing the DOJ’s movement away from the use of invasive 
structural reform because of internal directives).  
 141. For example, in New Orleans there was approximately a sixteen-
month gap between the conclusion of the investigation and the signing of a 
consent decree. United States v. City of New Orleans, No. 2:12-cv-01924-SM-
JCW, at 2 (E.D. La. July 24, 2013) [hereinafter New Orleans Consent Decree], 
available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-LA-0001-0001.pdf 
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The goal of every negotiation is to reach a negotiated settle-
ment that outlines all of the necessary policy and procedural 
changes in a single document. As one current DOJ litigator ex-
plained, “[a] negotiated agreement is a compromise.”142 Neither 
the municipality nor the DOJ gets everything they want in a 
negotiated settlement. Remember, no § 14141 case has actually 
resulted in trial.143 Both parties typically start a negotiation by 
making demands that they fully expect the other side to re-
ject.144 This anchors the negotiation and allows for an eventual 
 
(consent decree regarding the New Orleans Police Department). There, the 
DOJ issued a report detailing its investigative findings on March 16, 2011, 
and eventually came to terms on a consent decree on July 24, 2012. Id.; see al-
so U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW 
ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT, at v (2011), available at http://www.justice 
.gov/crt/about/spl/nopd_report.pdf. In Detroit, that gap was approximately a 
year. There, the DOJ handed down technical assistance letters between March 
and June of 2002 before agreeing to two different consent decrees on June 12, 
2003. See United States v. City of Detroit, No. 03-72258, at 6 (E.D. Mich. June 
12, 2003) [hereinafter Detroit Consent Decree], available at http://www.justice 
.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/dpd/detroitpd_uofwdcd_613.pdf (consent decrees 
regarding use of force and arrest and witness detention); Letter from Steven 
H. Rosenbaum, Chief, Special Litigation Section, Dep’t of Justice, and Jeffrey 
G. Collins, U.S. Attorney, Eastern Dist. of Mich., to Ruth Carter, Corporation 
Counsel, City of Detroit (Mar. 6, 2002), available at http://www 
.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/dpd/detroit_3_6.php (referred to as the 
Detroit Police Department Use of Force Findings Letter); Letter from Steven 
H. Rosenbaum, Chief, Special Litigation Section, Dep’t of Justice, and Jeffrey 
G. Collins, U.S. Attorney, Eastern Dist. of Mich., to Ruth Carter, Corporation 
Counsel, City of Detroit (Apr. 4, 2002), available at http://www 
.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/dpd/detroit_4_4.php (referred to as the 
Detroit Police Department Holding Cell Findings Letter); Letter from Steven 
H. Rosenbaum, Chief Special Litigation Section, Dep’t of Justice, and Jeffrey 
G. Collins, U.S. Attorney, Eastern Dist. of Mich., to Ruth Carter, Corporation 
Counsel, City of Detroit (June 5, 2002), available at http://www 
.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/dpd/detroit_6_5.php (referred to as the 
Detroit Police Department Holding Cell Findings Letter). And in Seattle, it 
took a little over seven months to complete this process. In that case, the DOJ 
issued a findings letter on December 16, 2011 and entered into a settlement 
agreement on July 27, 2012. United States v. City of Seattle, No. 2:12-cv-
01282-JLR, at 4 (W.D. Wa. July 27, 2012) [hereinafter Seattle Settlement 
Agreement] (settlement agreement and stipulated order of resolution); see also 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE SEATTLE 
POLICE DEPARTMENT (Dec. 16, 2011), available at http://www 
.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/spd_findletter_12-16-11.pdf (explaining 
the DOJ’s investigation of the Seattle police department). 
 142. Interview #5, supra note 129, at 4.  
 143. Interview #18, supra note 116, at 12 (“One of the challenges that the 
[DOJ] has is [that] there haven’t been any litigated pattern or practice cas-
es.”).  
 144. Interview #5, supra note 129, at 4 (explaining that in past negotia-
tions, the DOJ has started by asking for significantly more reforms than they 
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compromise somewhere in the middle.145 The DOJ understands 
that it will be unable to transform every aspect of a police de-
partment’s organization or culture in a way that comports with 
best practices. Instead, the DOJ merely attempts to negotiate a 
reasonably feasible set of reforms that ought to improve the 
likelihood that police officers will behave constitutionally.146 
The qualitative interview data from this Article provides useful 
insight into how the negotiation process works. From these ac-
counts, four trends emerge.  
First, there does appear to be a genuine, good faith negoti-
ation that happens between the DOJ and the targeted police 
agency.147 As a police administrator involved in the negotiation 
process explained, on “[t]he negotiation side, there was a lot of 
give and take in terms of what we thought we could do . . . and 
in what we thought would still make sense for [our depart-
ment] as a whole.”148 DOJ litigators also recognize that negoti-
ated settlements require compromise.149 As one DOJ litigator 
acknowledged, “every city is different.”150  
Ultimately though, correcting unconstitutional practices 
through compromise seems counterintuitive. Why, after all, 
should there be any negotiating about the correction of uncon-
stitutional practices? The answer is at the heart of the complex 
SRL process. There is no perfect formula that a police depart-
ment can implement to prevent unconstitutional misconduct 
amongst its ranks. Instead, there are best practices that lead-
ing experts in the field believe encourage lawful behavior. The 
negotiation process, thus, invites compromise between the tar-
 
expect to actually get through a negotiated settlement; “you don’t want to 
begin in your compromise position,” but instead start by making lofty de-
mands, thereby allowing each side to meet in the middle).  
 145. Id. (explaining the process of making demands and eventually reach-
ing compromise).  
 146. In his study of SRL from a criminal justice and public policy perspec-
tive, Professor Joshua Chanin has called this process “negotiated justice.” 
Chanin, supra note 30, at 1. 
 147. Interview with Independent Monitor #7, at 3–4 (July 18, 2013) [here-
inafter Interview #7] (on file with author) (stating that police departments are 
“able to have some form of negotiation about certain things that are placed in-
to the agreement that may just not be operationally sound because of the 
unique features of the Department”).   
 148. Interview with Police Administrator #16, at 3 (July 29, 2013) [herein-
after Interview #16] (on file with author) (explaining that, “the other side had 
their own police experts that had that in mind as well”).  
 149. Interview #5, supra note 129, at 4 (“A negotiated agreement is a com-
promise.”).  
 150. Id.   
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geted police agency and the DOJ—with the DOJ demanding ex-
tensive, costly reforms and the police agency attempting to lim-
it the scope of the federal oversight.151  
Second, even though these settlement agreements do ap-
pear to emerge via true negotiation between various stakehold-
ers, the DOJ typically holds an advantageous bargaining posi-
tion. The DOJ has statutory authority to bring formal pattern 
or practice litigation in the event that a local municipality re-
fuses to negotiate a settlement agreement. The DOJ has also 
demanded similar reforms across different municipalities. Ac-
cording to participants, the United States has attempted to lev-
erage the contents of previous agreements to gain a bargaining 
endowment at various times in recent negotiations. As one for-
mer monitor and DOJ official explained, “the [DOJ] can use the 
threat of . . . litigation to get [police] departments to settle.”152 
So far, “no pattern or practice case has come to trial . . . and re-
sulted in a decision one way or the other,” in part because “no 
city has wanted to risk litigation.”153  
Third, since the DOJ is a repeat litigator in the § 14141 
context, the DOJ negotiates differently than a local police agen-
cy. Marc Galanter has written on the structural advantages 
that repeat players in the court system have over individuals 
who only litigate a single case.154 In the context of § 14141 set-
tlements, it appears that the DOJ is openly concerned with the 
precedent established by each agreement. While the DOJ does 
not demand absolute consistency across agreements, it does 
recognize that inconsistency in settlement terms may be harm-
 
 151. See, e.g., Interview #5, supra note 129, at 4 (stating that neither side 
wants to “begin in [their] compromise position” and also explaining how each 
side expects to give a little during negotiations).  
 152. Interview #18, supra note 116, at 12.  
 153. Id.  
 154. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Specu-
lations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974). Galanter 
distinguishes between repeat players (those who are engaged in multiple simi-
lar litigations over time) and one-shotters (those who litigate only on rare oc-
casions). Id. at 97–104. Repeat players have advanced knowledge and exper-
tise in the area of litigation, economics of scale, and the ability to play the odds 
over a long series of cases. Id. at 98–100. This means that repeat players have 
a structural advantage in our legal system. As Galanter explains, repeat play-
ers have better “information, [the] ability to surmount cost barriers, and [the] 
skill to navigate restrictive procedural requirements." Id. at 119. Since repeat 
players are engaged in the same type of litigation time and time again, their 
goals are different than a one-shotter. Id. at 100. One-shotters simply want to 
maximize their individual return in any given case. Id. The repeat player 
wants to establish valuable precedent that will be of use in future cases. Id.  
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ful in future negotiations.155 This suggests that DOJ recognizes 
it is a repeat player in pattern or practice litigation. As a result, 
it is concerned not just about securing a satisfactory settle-
ment, but also about how that settlement might reflect on the 
DOJ’s bargaining position in future negotiations.156  
Fourth, police unions commonly attempt to intervene in 
settlement negotiations with the intent of blocking reforms that 
may increase oversight or otherwise burden frontline police of-
ficers.157 This is understandable since policies implemented as 
part of SRL may affect the day-to-day work of frontline officers. 
An organized labor unit designed to enhance working condi-
tions for its members should rationally want to block such 
changes—or at minimum be a party to any negotiations. Courts 
have thus far rejected multiple union requests and allowed ne-
gotiation to proceed exclusively between departmental admin-
istration and the DOJ.158 In interviews, police administrators 
suggested that this makes structural reform a particularly suc-
cessful accountability tool.159 Police chiefs often complain that 
collective bargaining restrains their ability to implement ac-
countability measures.160 Thus, SRL appears to provide reform-
minded police chiefs with legal cover to implement wide-
ranging reforms, without having to get union approval.161 Once 
 
 155. Interview #5, supra note 129, at 4 (using the example of how the DOJ 
wants a clear and cogent answer for why they may change the ratio of super-
visors to patrol officers slightly from one jurisdiction to the next, thereby en-
suring consistency).  
 156. Id. (stating that “[w]e try to be consistent or at least know why we are 
not being consistent”).  
 157. See, e.g., United States v. City of Los Angeles, No. 2:00-cv-11769-GAF-
RC, at 2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2001) (“The [police union] sought to join the negoti-
ations because a consent decree would ‘inevitably impact the current collective 
bargaining agreement between the City and the [police union].’” (citation omit-
ted)); see also Telephone Interview with Police Administrator #30 (Nov. 19, 
2013) [hereinafter Interview #30] (on file with author) (describing the union 
opposition to these sorts of reforms).    
 158. See, e.g., United States v. City of Los Angeles, 2:00-cv-11769-GAF-RC 
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2001) (order denying the Los Angeles Protective League’s 
motion to intervene). 
 159. Telephone Interview with Police Administrator #22 (Oct. 28, 2013) (on 
file with author) [hereinafter Interview #22] (explaining that SRL has enabled 
this police chief to push potentially unpopular but necessary reforms without 
having to get union approval). 
 160. KADLECK & TRAVIS, supra note 23, at 1–3 (describing the various ex-
amples of accountability measures that police unions have resisted across the 
country).  
 161. For a further explanation of these concepts in organizational theory, 
see Peer C. Fiss & Edward J. Zajac, The Symbolic Management of Strategic 
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these accountability measures are incorporated into a negotiat-
ed settlement and enforceable in federal court, police unions 
have little option but to accept them. In this way, SRL reframes 
the implementation of accountability measures. No longer are 
these reforms merely annoying encumbrances on the day-to-
day lives of frontline workers. Instead, SRL imbues these re-
forms with legal significance, increasing the probability of or-
ganizational acceptance.  
From this negotiation process, the DOJ reached its first 
§ 14141 settlement with the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police on 
April 4, 1997.162 Since then, the DOJ has agreed to a total of 24 
different settlements in 22 jurisdictions.163 Of these, 12 have re-
sulted full-scale SRL, supervised by the DOJ through the ap-
pointment of an external monitor.164 Figure 3 maps out all of 
the formal investigations and settlements.  
 
 
Change: Sensegiving via Framing and Decoupling, 49 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 1173 
(2006). Fiss and Zajac explain that “the success of strategic change will depend 
not only on an organization’s ability to implement new structures and process-
es, but also on the organization’s ability to convey the new mission and priori-
ties to its many stakeholders . . . [and] ensuring both understanding and ac-
ceptance of new strategies among key constituents.” Id. at 1173.  
 162. Rushin, supra note 14, at 3247.  
 163. Id.  
 164. Id. These cities include Pittsburgh, Steubenville, New Jersey, Wash-
ington, D.C., Los Angeles, Cincinnati, Detroit, Prince George’s County, the 
Virgin Islands, Seattle, East Haven, and New Orleans. Id.  
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C. CONTENT OF NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS 
While each negotiated settlement should be specifically tai-
lored to the unique needs of the individual municipality, the 
settlements have proven to be remarkably similar over time. 
There are several common issues addressed in negotiated set-
tlements. Most agreements have included sections regulating 
the use of force by police officers. Virtually all agreements re-
quire some change in officer training and the implementation 
of an early warning system to identify officers engaged in a pat-
tern of misconduct. Agreements also frequently regulate the 
handling of citizen complaints and the internal investigation of 
officer wrongdoing. About half of the agreements require exter-
nal auditing or monitoring to ensure compliance. In recent 
years, though, the DOJ under President Barack Obama has ex-
panded the scope of SRL to cover a wide range of topics, includ-
ing gender bias, interrogations, lineup procedures, recruitment, 
crisis intervention, and promotion standards.  
1. Use of Force 
Almost every single negotiated settlement signed by the 
DOJ pursuant to § 14141 addresses the policing agency’s use of 
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force. Some of these use of force stipulations regulated many 
different possible issues related to force.165 Others more narrow-
ly targeted a particular type of force at issue in the case.166 In 
total, all twelve of the negotiated settlements that involved 
monitors included a section regulating the use of force.167 This 
seems to be consistent with the legislative roots of § 14141, as 
the law originated in part out of a reaction to the brutal vio-
lence against Rodney King.168 Remember that the Lyons and 
City of Philadelphia cases also involved allegedly repetitive po-
lice brutality that private litigants and the DOJ were unable to 
stop through traditional remedies.169 As a report by the Police 
Executive Research Forum (PERF) concluded, “[p]olice use of 
force is one of the primary issues that the Civil Rights Division 
investigates . . . . Use of force has been a component in almost 
all of DOJ’s civil rights investigations to date, including consent 
decrees/settlement agreements . . . .”170 It should be no surprise, 
then, that even the very earliest agreements, like those in 
Pittsburgh and Steubenville, included a substantial portion 
dedicated to the regulation of use of force.171 The use of force 
stipulations in negotiated settlements fall into three categories.  
 
 165. See, e.g., New Orleans Consent Decree, supra note 141, at 19–39 (de-
tailing the expansive requirements regarding the use of force, regulating near-
ly every possible force usage, including oleoresin capsicum spray, canines, 
firearms, and electronic control weapons); United States v. City of Seattle, No. 
2:12-cv-01282-JLR, at 16–40 (W.D. Wa. July 27, 2013) [hereinafter Seattle 
Agreement], available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/spd_ 
consentdecree_7-27-12.pdf (detailing regulations on use of firearms, conduc-
tive energy devices, oleoresin capsicum spray, and impact weapons). 
 166. Memorandum of Agreement Between the U.S. Dep’t of Justice and 
Prince George’s County Police Department at 6–10 (Jan. 22, 2004) [hereinafter 
Prince George’s County MOA], available at http://www.clearinghouse 
.net/chDocs/public/PN-MD-0001-0002.pdf (specifically regulating only the use 
of force involving oleoresin capsicum spray).  
 167. See Rushin, supra note 14, at 3247; see, e.g., New Orleans Consent 
Decree, supra note 141, at 108–09 (describing the role of the monitor); Detroit 
Consent Decree, supra note 141, at 37–38 (describing the selection of the 
monitor). 
 168. See supra Part I.B. 
 169. See supra Part I.B. 
 170. PERF, supra note 121, at 12. 
 171. Consent Decree at 7, 9–11, United States v. City of Steubenville, No. 
2:97-cv-00966 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 28, 1997) [hereinafter Steubenville Consent De-
cree], available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-OH-0002 
-0005.pdf (requiring written reports on all use of force, the implementation of 
new policies, training in de-escalation, and more); Consent Decree at 10–12, 
United States v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 2:97-cv-00354-RJC (W.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 
1997) [hereinafter Pittsburgh Consent Decree], available at http://www 
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First, most regulate “[s]ubstantive policy on when officers 
may or may not use force.”172 Use of force sections commonly re-
quire departments to clearly delineate between different levels 
of force and to install policies on when certain levels of force are 
permissible.173 Second, virtually every agreement establishes 
strict reporting requirements for use of force incidents.174 Offic-
ers are required to notify their supervisors after any use of 
force or upon hearing any allegation of excessive use of force.175 
This type of requirement is evident in the Steubenville,176 Cin-
cinnati,177 Prince George’s County,178 New Orleans,179 Washing-
ton, D.C.,180 and Pittsburgh181 agreements. Third, most agree-
 
.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-PA-0003-0002.pdf (requiring documenta-
tion and regular oversight of use of force). 
 172. PERF, supra note 121, at 12. 
 173. Id. at 13 (stating that agreements often require departments to 
“[c]learly identif[y] categorical types and levels of force”). These agreements 
also normally establish requirements for various types of weapons. Id. at 13 
(“Policies, procedures, and training that are specific to certain weapons or 
types of force (such as firearms, Electronic Control Weapons, OC spray, canine 
use, and vehicle pursuits).”); see, e.g., New Orleans Consent Decree, supra note 
141, at 14–22 (including stipulations on the use of firearms, canines, electronic 
control weapons, and oleoresin capsicum spray); Seattle Agreement, supra 
note 165, at 12–20 (regulating various types of weapons and laying out de-
tailed rules on use of force reporting, training, use of force investigations, and 
supervisory oversight). 
 174. PERF, supra note 121, at 13 (stating that “[r]eporting, documentation 
and investigation” requirements are common in negotiated settlements that 
provide for a supervisor response and periodic auditing or review). For an ex-
ample, see Consent Decree at 6, United States v. The Territory of the Virgin 
Islands, No. 3:08-cv-00158-CVG-RM (D.V.I. Mar. 24, 2009) [hereinafter Virgin 
Islands Consent Decree], available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/ 
public/PN-VI-0001-0003.pdf (requiring the police department to document all 
uses of force in writing).   
 175. See, e.g., Virgin Islands Consent Decree, supra note 174, at 6. 
 176. Steubenville Consent Decree, supra note 171, at 9 (“The City shall de-
velop, and require all officers to complete, a written report each time . . . any 
type of force is used against an individual . . . .”).  
 177. Memorandum of Agreement Between the U.S. Dep’t of Justice & the 
City of Cincinnati, Ohio and the Cincinnati Police Dep’t para. 24 (April 12, 
2002) [hereinafter Cincinnati MOA], available at http://www 
.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-OH-0006-0002.pdf (“The use of force re-
port form will indicate each and every type of force that was used, and require 
the evaluation of each use of force.”). 
 178. Consent Decree at 15, United States v. Prince George’s County, Md., 
No. 8:04-cv-00185 (D. Md. Jan 22, 2004) [hereinafter Canine Consent Decree] 
(explaining the reporting requirements for canine use of force in particular).  
 179. New Orleans Consent Decree, supra note 141, at 24 (establishing the 
use of force policy and laying out requirements for use of force investigations).  
 180. Memorandum of Agreement Between the U.S. Dep’t of Justice & the 
District of Columbia & the D.C. Metro. Police Dep’t paras. 53–55 (June 13, 
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ments establish detailed procedures for how departments ought 
to investigate use of force incidents.182 In sum, the negotiated 
settlements consistently demonstrate a concern for the report-
ing, regulation, and investigation of use of force incidents.  
2. Early Intervention and Risk Management Systems 
A large number of settlements, including the vast majority 
of settlements resulting in monitoring, require the development 
of an early intervention system (EIS) to manage risk.183 The 
DOJ has required the development of these systems in the Los 
Angeles,184 Pittsburgh,185 Cincinnati,186 Steubenville,187 Washing-
ton, D.C.,188 New Jersey,189 New Orleans,190 and the Virgin Is-
 
2001) [hereinafter Washington, D.C. MOA], available at http://www 
.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-DC-0001-0001.pdf (explaining the report-
ing requirements for use of force). 
 181. Pittsburgh Consent Decree, supra note 171, at 10–11 (requiring offic-
ers to complete written reports on uses of force).  
 182. PERF, supra note 121, at 13. For examples of these sorts of stipula-
tions, see Consent Decree at 23–27, United States v. City of L.A. , No. 2:00-cv-
11769-GAF-RC (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2001) [hereinafter Los Angeles Consent 
Decree], available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-CA-0002 
-0006.pdf (laying out the terms of the use of force investigations). The Los An-
geles agreement typifies this trend as it mandates the creation of a unit dedi-
cated to the investigation of use of force incidents housed in the Operations 
Headquarters Bureau. Id. at 23. The Los Angeles agreement also establishes a 
chain of command when an officer uses specified force. Id. at 23–27. For other 
examples of this trend, see Canine Consent Decree, supra note 178, at 15–17 
(applying specifically to use of canine force).  
 183. PERF, supra note 121, at 16 (concluding that a large number of nego-
tiated settlements have inevitably required the development of some type of 
early intervention system).  
 184. Los Angeles Consent Decree, supra note 182, at 9–22 (describing the 
development of the TEAMS II system, the management and coordination of 
risk assessment responsibilities, and the performance evaluation system).  
 185. Pittsburgh Consent Decree, supra note 171, at 6–9 (stating that the 
city should implement an early warning system within twelve months).  
 186. Cincinnati MOA, supra note 177, paras. 57–66.  
 187. Steubenville Consent Decree, supra note 171, 28–29 (describing the 
information system meant to supervise officer behavior). 
 188. Washington, D.C. MOA, supra note 180, paras. 106–17 (describing the 
personnel performance management system (PPMS)).   
 189. United States v. New Jersey State Police, No. 99-5970(MLC) paras. 
40–56 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 1999) [hereinafter New Jersey Consent Decree], avail-
able at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-NJ-0002-0001.pdf (de-
scribing the development of the management awareness program).  
 190. New Orleans Consent Decree, supra note 141, at 80–83 (outlining the 
terms of the new early warning system to be implemented as part of the con-
sent decree).  
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lands191 cases. Research suggests that in any given police de-
partment, a small number of officers typically use force more 
often than the rest of the department.192 One way to limit un-
lawful uses of force is to identify and monitor these officers 
with a high proclivity to use force. EIS does just this, “flagg[ing] 
officers for closer review” by “collect[ing] data and analyz[ing] 
patterns of activity.”193 These systems go by different names, 
but their central goal is to “identify opportunities to reduce 
risky behavior, department liability, and citizen complaints.”194  
The system articulated in the Washington, D.C., negotiat-
ed settlement is reasonably representative of those required by 
most settlements.195 There, the DOJ required the police de-
partment to collect numerous data points on officer behavior 
and catalog this information into a computerized database.196 
Supervisors were then ordered to use this database to identify 
“any pattern or series of incidents” that indicate that an officer 
may be engaged in systematic misconduct.197 If such a pattern 
existed, the settlement required the supervisor to take a more 
intensive review of the behavior.198  
Law enforcement departments have used these types of 
early intervention and risk management systems for decades,199 
and have increased in popularity because of the belief that “10 
 
 191. Virgin Islands Consent Decree, supra note 174, at 12–16 (describing 
the planned implementation of a management and risk supervision system).  
 192. PERF, supra note 121, at 16 (“Research has long suggested that a 
small percentage of police officers account for a high percentage of use-of-force 
incidents.”).  
 193. Id.  
 194. Id.  
 195. Washington, D.C. MOA, supra note 180, para. 106. 
 196. Id. at para. 106 (explaining the definition and requirements of the 
PPMS computer database). The settlement required the PPMS to include in-
formation on use of force incidents, canine deployment, officer-involved fire-
arm discharges, vehicle pursuits, complaints, commendations, criminal arrests 
and investigations, training history, educational background, and more. Id. 
para. 107. 
 197. Id. para. 112(a). 
 198. Id. para. 112(b). 
 199. SAMUEL WALKER ET AL., POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, 
SUPERVISION AND INTERVENTION WITHIN EARLY INTERVENTION SYSTEMS: A 
GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT CHIEF EXECUTIVES 2 (2005) [hereinafter 
PERF EARLY INTERVENTION SYSTEMS], available at http://www.policeforum 
.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/Early_Intervention_Systems/ 
supervsion%20and%20intervention%20within%20early%20intervention% 
20systems%202005.pdf (“EIS have been used in the law enforcement commu-
nity for more than 25 years . . . .”).  
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percent of . . . officers cause 90 percent of the problems.”200 Ini-
tial research demonstrates that these measures also have a 
positive impact on police agencies as they give supervisors ad-
ditional information about their officers, foster a climate of ac-
countability, decrease complaints, and help facilitate organiza-
tional management.201 
3. Complaint Procedures and Investigations 
Nearly every single monitored settlement provides some 
stipulations on how the agency ought to collect and process citi-
zen complaints about officer conduct.202 Settlements that in-
clude stipulations on complaints address the same three basic 
issues—the intake of complaints, the investigation of com-
plaints, and the complaint evaluation process.203 The process of 
handling citizen complaints required under these negotiated 
settlements roughly mirrors those recommended by the Inter-
national Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), in coordination 
with the Office of Community Oriented Police Services 
(COPS).204 They also match those required by the Commission 
 
 200. Samuel Walker et al., Early Warning Systems: Responding to the 
Problem Police Officer, NAT’L INST. JUST. RES. BRIEF, July 2001, at 1, available 
at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/188565.pdf; see also id. at 2 (explaining 
that in 1999 around twenty-seven percent of departments servicing a metro-
politan area of at least 50,000 people had an EIS in place and twelve percent 
of agencies in 1999 claimed that they would soon implement such a system).  
 201. Id. at 4, 6–7 (stating that “the qualitative component of the research 
found that these systems have potentially significant effects . . .” and identify-
ing multiple potential benefits).  
 202. Seattle represents the rare settlement that did not establish detailed 
parameters on complaint procedures. See Seattle Agreement, supra note 165, 
at 46 (stating that the DOJ found that the existing complaint processesing 
system through the Office of Professional Accountability was sufficient). For 
examples of settlments that lay out detailed citizen complaint procedures, see 
Los Angeles Consent Decree, supra note 182, at 29–35 (detailing rules on the 
initiation, investigation, and adjudication of complaints); Washington, D.C. 
MOA, supra note 180, paras. 92–104 (including sections on the receipt of citi-
zen complaints, the investigation of complaints, and the evaluation of these 
allegations). 
 203. See, e.g., Steubenville Consent Decree, supra note 171, at 15–22 (set-
ting requirements for starting an investigation pursuant to a complaint, con-
ducting an investigation, and evaluating a complaint’s validity); Pittsburgh 
Consent Decree, supra note 171, at 23–32 (laying out standards for each of 
these three different phases of the complaint process); Prince George’s County 
MOA, supra note 166, at 14–18 (including components about the receipt, 
tracking, investigation, and adjudication of complaints against officers).  
 204. See INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, BUILDING TRUST BETWEEN THE 
POLICE AND THE CITIZENS THEY SERVE: AN INTERNAL AFFAIRS PROMISING 
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on Accreditation for Law Enforcement (CALEA).205 These or-
ganizations argue that improved complaint procedures provide 
three separate benefits.206 First, these procedures give adminis-
trators a more accurate understanding of the scope and depth 
of misconduct problems within police agencies.207 Second, the 
presence of these procedures may incentivize officers to be ac-
countable for misconduct.208 And third, these procedures may 
increase public trust in police agencies.209  
4. Training Overhaul 
Negotiated settlements commonly require departments to 
adopt major overhauls of their training procedures. This in-
cludes both training for new officers and in-service training for 
existing officers.210  
The settlements generally require the departments to doc-
ument the training history of each officer.211 The DOJ normally 
makes some stipulation as to the subjects of these trainings.212 
The DOJ has not gone to the extent of stipulating the content of 
 
PRACTICES GUIDE FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 20–26 (2008), available at 
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Publications/e080917232-BuildingTrust.pdf.  
 205. Id. at 22 (discussing the CALEA standards for law enforcement agen-
cies).  
 206. Id. at 17 (discussing complaint procedures as an important part of 
internal affairs). 
 207. Id. at 17 (arguing that these improved complaint procedures provide a 
more “fair, thorough, accurate, and impartial” view of misconduct present in a 
department).  
 208. Id. (emphasizing the possible improvement in officer morale and be-
havior).  
 209. Id. (explaining how these measures will “increase trust within the 
community”).  
 210. See, e.g., Steubenville Consent Decree, supra note 171, at 6–7 (identi-
fying the need for both entry and annual in-service training); Cincinnati MOA, 
supra note 177, para. 82 (noting the need for training for “all new recruits and 
as part of annual in-service training”).  
 211. See, e.g., Virgin Islands Consent Decree, supra note 174, para. 77 
(“The VIPD shall continue to maintain training records regarding every VIPD 
officer that reliably indicate the training each officer has received. The train-
ing records shall, at a minimum, include the course description and duration, 
curriculum, and instructor for each officer.”); New Jersey Consent Decree, su-
pra note 189, paras. 108–09 (“[T]he State Police will track all training infor-
mation, including name of the course, date started, date completed, and train-
ing location for each member receiving training.”).  
 212. See, e.g., New Jersey Consent Decree, supra note 189, para. 100 (iden-
tifying some of the areas that New Jersey must broadly address in trainings); 
Prince George’s County MOA, supra note 166, paras. 54–55 (ordering the de-
partment to appoint a training committee to develop curriculum and stipulat-
ing the subjects that ought to be covered). 
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the trainings in much specificity.213 That is to say, the DOJ 
gives the agency broad discretion to create their own training 
materials addressing each relevant subject, so long as that 
training is “consistent with . . . [the law] and proper police 
practices.”214 In some cases, though, the DOJ has gone as far as 
specifying the length of time that each officer must be 
trained.215 The topics covered by the training section of each 
settlement appear to be uniquely tailored to the apparent prob-
lem in the jurisdiction. 
Empirical evidence suggests that departments that rigor-
ously train their officers suffer from lower rates of miscon-
duct.216 And perhaps equally important to the department ad-
ministrators, enhanced training lowers the likelihood of a 
department suffering stiff penalties in private litigation.217 Alt-
hough there is some academic disagreement about the exact 
type of training necessary to reduce police wrongdoing, police 
professionals have increasingly recognized the absolute neces-
sity of continual law enforcement training.218  
5. Bias-Free Policing 
A handful of the agreements demonstrate some concern for 
the prevention of biased policing practices by requiring de-
partments to regularly review and audit officer records to un-
 
 213. See, e.g., New Jersey Consent Decree, supra note 189, para. 100 (stat-
ing that New Jersey needs to develop policies to train recruits and troopers on 
various issues related to diversity, complaint procedures, professionalism, and 
many more topics, but not specifically articulating the exact content of these 
trainings); Prince George’s County MOA, supra note 166, para. 55 (listing the 
areas to be addressed in training, but leaving it up to the department to devel-
op policies that address these topics in accordance with the law). 
 214. Virgin Islands Consent Decree, supra note 174, para. 75.  
 215. See, e.g., Steubenville Consent Decree, supra note 171, para. 13(a)–(b) 
(identifying field training that must last at least twelve weeks and stating 
that existing officers must partake in in-service training “for at least 40 hours 
each year”). 
 216. See James J. Fyfe, Training To Reduce Police-Civilian Violence, in 
POLICE VIOLENCE 165, 174 (William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996) (de-
scribing one training program that led to a substantial reduction in complaints 
of abuse).  
 217. The Court has allowed litigants to hold police departments liable for 
the actions of their officers in the event that the police department was delib-
erately indifferent in its failure to train or supervise. See Monell v. Dep’t of 
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). This case opened law enforcement depart-
ments to civil litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the event that their failure 
to provide adequate training contributed to an officer’s violation of an individ-
ual’s constitutional right. See supra notes 9, 43 and accompanying text.  
 218. See Fyfe, supra note 216, at 176–77. 
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cover patterns of racial bias.219 This concern for bias appears 
particularly evident in the Pittsburgh,220 Steubenville,221 New 
Jersey,222 and New Orleans223 consent decrees.224 For example, 
in New Jersey, the DOJ required the State Police to collect and 
monitor the racial breakdown of occupants in motor vehicle 
stops, in hopes of thwarting the use of racial profiling.225 The 
agreement then required the monitor to compare the racial 
breakdown of motor vehicle stops with the racial and ethnic 
percentage of drivers within the State Police’s jurisdiction.226 
6. Community and Problem-Oriented Policing 
Another emerging trend in negotiated settlements is the 
inclusion of community and problem-oriented policing require-
ments. Even though this component is explicitly mentioned in 
only one of the negotiated settlements—the recent New Orle-
ans agreement227—some monitors have openly pushed commu-
nity and problem-oriented policing during the implementation 
of structural reform in other cities as a possible solution to ag-
gressive policing strategies that stigmatized minority commu-
 
 219. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Consent Decree, supra note 171, para. 20; 
Steubenville Consent Decree, supra note 171, para. 77.  
 220. Pittsburgh Consent Decree, supra note 171, para. 20 (“The City shall 
conduct regular audits and reviews of potential racial bias, including use of 
racial epithets, by all officers.”).  
 221. Steubenville Consent Decree, supra note 171, para. 77 (“The City shall 
conduct regular audits and reviews of potential racial bias.”).  
 222. New Jersey Consent Decree, supra note 189, paras. 49–50 (discussing 
plans to monitor the racial breakdown of stops in an effort to thwart racial 
profiling).  
 223. New Orleans Consent Decree, supra note 141, paras. 177–222 (laying 
out terms, in great detail, for how the New Orleans Police Department could 
avoid racially biased and gender biased policing tactics). The recent settlement 
in New Orleans, though, has taken a more expansive view of biased policing, 
expanding bias-free policing to protect undocumented immigrants and LGBT 
persons. See id. para. 184. 
 224. The Los Angeles Consent Decree includes some mention of racial bias, 
too. See Los Angeles Consent Decree, supra note 182, para. 138. But this men-
tion of racial bias seems somewhat less significant than other negotiated set-
tlements that discussed the issue. The same can be said for the Washington, 
D.C. negotiated settlement. See, e.g., Washington, D.C. MOA, supra note 180, 
para. 76.  
 225. New Jersey Consent Decree, supra note 189, para. 50.  
 226. Id. para. 54. 
 227. New Orleans Consent Decree, supra note 141, at 60–63, paras. 223–33 
(“NOPD agrees to reassess its staffing allocation and personnel deployment, 
including its use of specialized units and deployment by geographic area, to 
ensure that core operations support community policing and problem-solving 
initiatives . . . .”).  
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nities.228 While there remain some concerns about the disparate 
benefits of community policing229 and the general disinterest of 
law enforcement officers in community policing efforts,230 crimi-
nological research suggests that these measures increase com-
munity trust and redefine law enforcement goals along the 
lines of community interests.231  
The range of topics covered by negotiated settlements is 
admittedly broader than the list of topics above. Settlements 
have also touched on a range of issues related to interroga-
tions,232 lineup procedures,233 gang unit management,234 canine 
deployment,235 crisis intervention,236 and promotion evalua-
tions.237  
 
 228. For example, a member of the Cincinnati monitoring team explained 
that part of the team’s goal was to encourage the department to “chang[e] from 
saturation patrol and aggressive policing to community policing, problem ori-
ented policing and problem solving.” Interview #18, supra note 116, at 3.  
 229. See generally WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME 
AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 107 (1990) (identi-
fying how minority residents feel less of the positive influences of community 
policing efforts and explaining that “[t]he lack of positive effects for those at 
the bottom of the social ladder may be related to their more limited awareness 
of the programs”).  
 230. See generally Antony M. Pate & Penny Shtull, Community Policing 
Grows in Brooklyn: An Inside View of the New York City Police Department’s 
Model Precinct, 40 CRIME & DELINQ. 384 (1994) (finding some officers were 
generally disinterested in the community policing effort).  
 231. See generally Wesley G. Skogan, The Promise of Community Policing, 
in POLICE INNOVATION: CONTRASTING PERSPECTIVES 27, 31 (David Weisburd 
& Anthony A. Braga eds., 2006) (“[A]fter eight years of citywide community 
policing, Chicagoans’ views of their police improved by 10–15 percentage 
points on measures of their effectiveness, responsiveness, and demeanor.”).  
 232. New Orleans Consent Decree, supra note 141, paras. 163–70 (laying 
out standards for custodial interrogations).  
 233. Id. paras. 171–76 (establishing procedures for photographic lineup 
administrations). 
 234. Los Angeles Consent Decree, supra note 182, paras. 106–07 (requiring 
the development and administration of gang management policy).   
 235. Prince George’s County MOA, supra note 166, paras. 40–48 (establish-
ing thorough regulation of canine deployment).  
 236. Seattle Agreement, supra note 165, paras. 130–37 (laying out regula-
tions on crisis intervention via the creation of the crisis intervention commit-
tee).  
 237. New Orleans Consent Decree, supra note 141, paras. 295–305 (estab-
lishing both performance evaluations and promotions and describing how the-
se evaluations ought to be used in the promotion process).  
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D. APPOINTMENT OF MONITOR  
If the DOJ and the targeted police agency agree to the ap-
pointment of an external monitor, the parties next enter the 
monitor appointment phase. During this stage, the parties 
must select a mutually agreeable external team of experts to 
oversee the upcoming structural reforms. This is a critical stage 
since “a city’s relationship with the monitor is a critical factor 
in how swiftly reforms can be made and a consent decree end-
ed.”238 No research into SRL in police departments has ever 
evaluated the monitor selection process. This void in the litera-
ture is understandable. Generally, this selection process hap-
pened through a confidential negotiation process behind closed 
doors.239 To better understand how this monitor selection pro-
cess works, this section supplements interview data with rec-
ords from the monitor selection process in New Orleans. There, 
Federal District Judge Susie Morgan of the Eastern District of 
Louisiana ordered a transparent monitor selection involving 
public hearings, public disclosure of each monitoring team’s 
proposal, and negotiations between a ten-member panel of offi-
cials from New Orleans and the DOJ.240 From these court rec-
ords and stakeholder interviews, a couple trends emerge about 
the monitor selection process.  
First, monitors are expensive.241 As a result, cost control is 
a critically important issue in the monitor appointment process. 
Remember, the local police agency has to foot the bill for any 
monitoring services.242 Thus, a rational municipality will want 
 
 238. PERF, supra note 121, at 3.  
 239. Order Regarding Request for Proposal at 3, United States v. New Or-
leans, No. 2:12-cv-01924 (E.D. La. Sept. 6, 2012) [hereinafter New Orleans 
Monitor Search Order] (“The Court further observes that in other cases involv-
ing consent decrees negotiated to resolve claims brought pursuant to 
[§ 14141], the United States participated in selecting monitors outside of a ju-
risdiction’s standard procurement procedure.”).   
 240. Edmund W. Lewis, NOPD Consent Decree Moves Forward, LA. WKLY. 
(Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.louisianaweekly.com/nopd-consent-decree-moves 
-forward (explaining the selection process and identifying the ten-person panel 
entrusted with the selection of a monitor); John Simerman, Federal Judge 
Picks Feds’ Choice for NOPD Monitor, ADVOC. (July 9, 2013), http:// 
www.theadvocate.com/news/6438217-123/federal-judge-picks-feds-choice (ex-
plaining the five public hearings held to discuss the appointment of the moni-
tor).   
 241. PERF, supra note 121, at 42 (stating that “[t]he costs of achieving 
compliance, and the legal costs paid to monitors, are sometimes contentious” 
and they are “often high”). 
 242. See, e.g., New Orleans Memorandum Regarding Monitor Candidates 
at 12–14, United States v. New Orleans, No. 2:12-cv-01924 (E.D. La. June 14, 
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to hire the cheapest monitor, so long as that monitor will help 
that municipality escape the negotiated settlement in an expe-
ditious manner. But the municipality does not have unilateral 
power to select an external monitor.243 Instead, the municipality 
must negotiate with the DOJ to select a monitoring team.244 
Costs are particularly critical for many cities targeted for fed-
eral monitoring in part because these communities have finite 
resources. In some of these municipalities, the high cost of mon-
itoring exacerbates preexisting financial troubles. The annual 
cost of monitoring typically tops $1,000,000.245 Figure 4 shows 
the average annual yearly cost of monitoring services in several 
of the police departments targeted for SRL thus far.246   
 
FIGURE 4. APPROXIMATE AVERAGE YEARLY COST OF 











The New Orleans monitor selection process illustrates the 
tension over allocating costs and burdens. There, the City and 
the DOJ sharply disagreed on the appropriate choice of moni-
tor, due in large part to substantial difference in cost between 
 
2013) [hereinafter New Orleans Memorandum Recommending Hillard 
Heintze] (detailing New Orleans’s concerns about the relatively high cost of 
monitoring that they would have to ultimately pay). 
 243. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Consent Decree, supra note 171, para. 70 (serving 
as an example of a typical clause found in negotiated settlements that requires 
the two sides to negotiate on the selection of a monitor). 
 244. See, e.g., id. 
 245. See, e.g., PERF, supra note 121, at 1 (“The 2012 New Orleans consent 
decree is expected to . . . cost more than $11 million . . . .”). 
 246. Id. (identifying cost of New Orleans monitoring); id. at 34 (identifying 
other costs based on estimates given by city officials, monitors, and media re-
ports at a PERF conference on federal oversight of local police departments); 
First Year Budget for Monitoring of Seattle Settlement Agreement, SEATTLE 
CITY COUNCIL (Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.seattle.gov/council/harrell/ 
attachments/Signed_Nov_2012-Oct_2013_Budget.pdf (stating that the first 
year budget for the Seattle monitoring will sit around $880,000). 
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the two options; New Orleans advocated for a cheaper monitor, 
while the DOJ supported the bid from a more expensive 
team.247 Ultimately, the court sided with the DOJ.248  
Second, there is widespread disagreement about the rela-
tive importance of a monitor’s law enforcement background. Po-
lice agencies frequently push for monitors with law enforce-
ment background.249 When trying to bring about organizational 
change, one police chief explained, front line staff are more will-
ing to accept changes if they know that “the leader bringing 
about the change has worn those shoes for a while.”250 The chief 
further clarified that monitors with law enforcement experience 
are also more credible because former cops “understand [that] if 
we put accountability measures in place, they [are going to] af-
fect your crime fighting” abilities.251 As a result, the chief con-
cluded that monitoring teams in the future “should be com-
prised mostly of people with prior law enforcement experience,” 
and “the top monitor should have very high level police man-
agement experience.”252 Conversely, the DOJ has indicated that 
while monitoring teams should include some individuals with 
law enforcement experience, lawyers should play an important 
role in the process.253 As one DOJ litigator explained, “in all of 
these cases, there are complicated issues of constitutional law 
[and] criminal procedure involved” including “evidence gather-
 
 247. The two finalist options were the Hillard Heintze team and Sheppard 
Mullin team. See generally New Orleans Memorandum Recommending Hillard 
Heintze, supra note 242. The Sheppard Mullin team proposed a four-year 
monitoring period for approximately $7.8 million with a cap set at $8.9 mil-
lion. Id. at 13. Hillard Heintze offered to complete the same basic service for a 
capped price of around $7 million. Id. at 12–13. The United States, though, 
asserted that the City needs to comply with the Constitution, even if doing so 
costs money. United States’ Memorandum Recommending Sheppard Mullin as 
Consent Decree Monitor at 17, United States v. New Orleans, No. 2:12-cv-
01924 (E.D. La. June 14, 2013) [hereinafter U.S. Memorandum Recommend-
ing Sheppard Mullin]. 
 248. Ramon Antonio Vargas, NOPD Consent Decree Monitor Chosen: Shep-
pard Mullin Gets Contract, TIMES-PICAYNE (July 5, 2013), http://www.nola 
.com/crime/index.ssf/2013/07/nopd_consent_decree_monitor_ch_1.html. 
 249 . See New Orleans Memorandum Recommending Hillard Heintze, su-
pra note 242, at 2–6 (endorsing Hillard Heintze because of the team’s experi-
ence in law enforcement). 
 250. Interview #16, supra note 148, at 10.  
 251. Id.  
 252. Id.  
 253. See Interview #12, supra note 116, at 7–8. 
RUSHIN_4FMT 4/7/2015  5:27 PM 
2015] STRUCTURAL REFORM LITIGATION 1391 
 
ing, data collection, [and] document review that needs to hap-
pen.”254  
As the participant concluded, “[a]ttorneys are trained to do 
that” kind of work.255 The DOJ official added that “[t]o the ex-
tent that there are court processes [involved in monitoring], it’s 
helpful to have attorneys that can interface with the court” and 
explain the “legal ramifications” of the reforms.256 The court 
records suggest that this tension was a significant issue in the 
New Orleans monitor selection process. In that case, New Orle-
ans advocated for the appointment of a monitoring team led by 
former law enforcement executives, while the DOJ pushed for a 
team led by lawyers.257 New Orleans emphasized the “crucial 
insight” that former law enforcement administrators could pro-
vide to the SRL process.258 The DOJ, though, insisted that law-
yers were well suited to “make difficult calls” that are legally 
“accurate, objective, and credible.”259 
E. MONITORED REFORM 
Once a police agency reaches a negotiated settlement with 
the DOJ, and the parties agree on the appointment of an exter-
nal monitor, the long and arduous reform process begins. The 
monitored reform process can take as little as five years.260 In 
 
 254. Id. at 8. 
 255. Id.  
 256. Id. (“It’s also very helpful to have attorneys that can sometimes trans-
late, sometimes explain to the legal entity at the jurisdiction, whether that’s 
the city attorney’s office or the state attorney’s office or county counsel, what-
ever it will be; what the legal ramifications are of some of these reforms.”).  
 257. New Orleans supported the Hillard Heintze monitoring team led by 
security and law enforcement experts. See New Orleans Memorandum Rec-
ommending Hillard Heintze, supra note 242, at 1. The DOJ supported the ap-
pointment of a monitoring team run by the law firm Sheppard Mullin. See 
U.S. Memorandum Recommending Sheppard Mullin, supra note 247, at 8–9 
(explaining the choice of Sheppard Mullin). 
 258. New Orleans Memorandum Recommending Hillard Heintze, supra 
note 242, at 1–2 (explaining the importance of “law enforcement experience 
and expertise” in applying “provisions that are directed toward law enforce-
ment rather than legal analysis”).  
 259. U.S. Memorandum Recommending Sheppard Mullin, supra note 247, 
at 14 (elaborating further that lawyers are well-suited to be “[f]air and 
[i]ndependent” and “make difficult calls”).  
 260. See infra Figure 5 (illustrating the length of monitored reform for each 
city involved in SRL thus far, and showing that Cincinnati and Prince 
George’s County took only five years).   
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some cases, though, this stage can take well over a decade.261 
Figure 5 shows the length of monitoring in all police agencies 
that have fully completed SRL.262 
 
FIGURE 5. LENGTH OF MONITORED REFORM FOR COMPLETED 
CASES 
 
City Length of Monitored Reform
Cincinnati 5.0 years263
Prince George’s County 5.0 years264
Steubenville 7.5 years265
Pittsburgh 8.2 years266
New Jersey 9.8 years267
Washington, D.C. 10.7 years268
Los Angeles 11.9 years269
 
The monitored reform process is also costly. As already dis-
cussed, the affected police agency must pay the cost of monitor-
ing, which often tops $1 million a year.270 The municipality 
 
 261. Id. (showing that Los Angeles and Washington, D.C.’s monitored re-
forms took over a decade).  
 262. This study calculated these monitored reform periods as the number 
of days between the date that the DOJ entered into a negotiated settlement 
with the deficient department and the date that the DOJ released the depart-
ment from the terms of the agreement. See Rushin, supra note 14, at 3244–47 
(listing the closure date); see also Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice to author 
(Apr. 24, 2013) [hereinafter Letter from DOJ] (on file with author) (listing 
agreement). This figure does not include cities that are still under monitoring.  
 263. The Cincinnati monitoring lasted from April 12, 2002, to April 12, 
2007—approximately 1826 days or 5.0 years. Rushin, supra note 14, at 3245, 
3247. 
 264. The Prince George’s County monitoring lasted from January 22, 2004, 
to January 13, 2009—approximately 1,818 days or 5.0 years. Id.  
 265. The Steubenville monitoring lasted from September 3, 1997, to March 
3, 2005—approximately 2,738 days or 7.5 years. Id. at 3244, 3247. 
 266. The Pittsburgh monitoring lasted from April 16, 1997, to June 16, 
2005—approximately 2983 days or 8.2 years. Id.  
 267. The New Jersey monitoring lasted from December 29, 1999, to Octo-
ber 26, 2009—approximately 3,589 days or 9.8 years. Id.  
 268. The Washington, D.C. monitoring lasted from June 13, 2001, to Feb-
ruary 10, 2012—approximately 3,884 days or 10.7 years. Id.  
 269. The Los Angeles monitoring lasted from June 15, 2001, to May 16, 
2013—approximately 4353 days or 11.9 years. Id.  
 270. See PERF, supra note 121, at 1, 34 (putting the monitoring costs 
somewhere between $800,000 and $2,300,000); see also U.S. Memorandum 
Recommending Sheppard Mullin, supra note 247, at 18 (describing the com-
peting proposals for monitors in New Orleans, with one offering a “four-year 
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must then cover the cost of all reforms required by the negoti-
ated settlement. These costs are substantial. For example, in 
Los Angeles, the cost of implementing reforms likely totaled 
around $80–90 million.271 When factoring in the cost of hiring 
the external monitor in Los Angeles, which came in at around 
$2 million a year,272 the Los Angeles price tag likely surpassed 
$100 million.273 This cost might sound starling at first. But con-
sidering the size of the city and the length of time it took to im-
plement these changes, the actual cost to Los Angeles taxpay-
ers was probably between $2 to $3 per city resident per year.274  
During this reform process, the external monitor regularly 
visits the police agency to audit departmental records and meet 
with officers.275 Based on these regular department visits and 
audits, monitors file public reports every three months evaluat-
ing the agency’s progress in implementing the terms of the set-
tlement.276 These quarterly reports are long and detailed, and 
describe the department’s observed progress in implementing 
 
capped cost estimate [of] $7,007,542” and the other suggesting a four-year cost 
of “$7,880,786, with a cap of $8,900,000”).   
 271. See Joseph Giordono & Jason Kandel, Police Union Threatens Suit; 
LAPD: League President Says Officers To File Federal Case About Consent De-
cree, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM, Nov. 2, 2000, at A8 (putting the cost of 
the Los Angeles consent decree at around $40 million to implement in the first 
year, with an additional $30–50 million in expenses in the years to follow).  
 272. Cf. PERF, supra note 121, at 34 (putting the Los Angeles monitoring 
cost at $15 million).  
 273. This estimate was derived by calculating the cost of monitoring—
roughly $2 million a year for over ten years—and adding it to the cost of the 
reforms. The $100 million figure likely underestimates the actual total cost. 
Accord id. at 34; Giordono & Kandel, supra note 271, at A8. 
 274. Over the 11.9 years that the City of Los Angeles was under a consent 
decree, the average population was 3,792,622. See Los Angeles (City), Califor-
nia, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 4, 2014), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/ 
states/06/0644000.html. Given that the estimated cost of the consent decree 
was around $100 million, the cost comes out to $26 a person for the entire time 
period. Spread out over 11.9 years, this comes out to about $2.19 per resident 
per year. See supra text accompanying note 273. 
 275. See, e.g., Interview with External Monitor #3, at 15 (July 2, 2013) 
[hereinafter Interview #3] (on file with author) (stating that “the monitoring 
team goes on site” on a regular basis); id. (“Some, like ours, we basically go on 
site one week each quarter to do our on site review and data analysis, inter-
views, those kinds of things. We get our reports, data, that we look at.”).  
 276. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITOR OF THE L.A. POLICE 
DEP’T, FIRST QUARTERLY REPORT 1–2 (Nov. 15, 2001) (stating that the moni-
tors in the Los Angeles case will issue quarterly reports covering approximate-
ly three months at a time); OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITOR OF THE 
DETROIT POLICE DEP’T, FIRST QUARTERLY REPORT 3 (Jan. 20, 2004) (describ-
ing the plan to issue reports approximately every three months and describing 
these reports as quarterly reports). 
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each component of the negotiated settlement.277 These quarterly 
reports also include the results of the monitor’s regular audits 
of departmental records.278  
The DOJ does not expect a police department to achieve 
100% compliance with all components of a negotiated settle-
ment. Instead, the DOJ generally requires that a police agency 
achieve “substantial compliance”—defined as the full satisfac-
tion of around 94% of all components of a settlement agree-
ment—before officially releasing the department from federal 
oversight.279 To determine whether a department has reached 
this critical 94% compliance threshold, monitors break down 
the negotiated settlement by paragraph and examine whether 
the department has fully satisfied each term of that para-
graph.280 In doing so, monitors examine both whether a de-
partment has instituted the mandatory policy change required 
by a paragraph, and whether the policy change has had the in-
tended effect.281  
For example, if the monitor finds a department to be in full 
compliance with fifty out of the sixty paragraphs of a negotiat-
 
 277. For reference, the first quarterly report in the New Orleans case was 
fifty-nine pages. OFFICE OF THE CONSENT DECREE MONITOR FOR THE NEW 
ORLEANS POLICE DEP’T, FIRST QUARTERLY REPORT (Nov. 29, 2013). The first 
quarterly report in the Washington, D.C. case was sixty-one pages. MICHAEL 
R. BROMWICH, OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITOR FOR THE 
METROPOLITAN POLICE DEP’T, FIRST QUARTERLY REPORT (Aug. 1, 2002). And 
the first quarterly report in the Pittsburgh case was sixty-five pages. AUDITOR 
OF THE PITTSBURGH BUREAU OF POLICE, QUARTERLY REPORT ENDING 
DECEMBER 15, 1997 (Dec. 15, 1997) [hereinafter FIRST QUARTERLY REPORT 
FOR PBP].    
 278. See, e.g., FIRST QUARTERLY REPORT FOR PBP, supra note 277, at 2 
(stating that “[m]embers of the audit team have collected data on-site and 
have been provided data, pursuant to specific requests, by the Pittsburgh Bu-
reau of Police . . . .” and included the findings in the quarterly reports).  
 279. Telephone Interview with External Monitor #10, at 4 (July 19, 2013) 
[hereinafter Interview #10] (on file with author) (stating that his team used a 
94% completion rate to measure compliance because “many of these elements 
require examination of documents . . . . [and t]o do that, we really need to do 
scientific sampling so we know they’re representative . . . . [S]o, what we were 
looking at was this sort of plus or minus 5% error range around that level.”); 
see also Telephone Interview with External Monitor #6, at 6 (June 19, 2013) 
[hereinafter Interview #6] (on file with author) (describing compliance). 
 280. Telephone Interview with External Monitor #1, at 9 (July 13, 2013) 
[hereinafter Interview #1] (on file with author) (explaining controversy sur-
rounding how writers break down settlements into paragraph segments).  
 281. Interview #6, supra note 279, at 6 (differentiating between phase one 
compliance—the measurement of “issuance of the policy”—and phase two—
“actual implementation”—and stating that both are necessary for the DOJ to 
agree that a department is in “substantial compliance”).  
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ed settlement, then that department has achieved 83.3% com-
pliance—well short of the targeted 94% range needed for sub-
stantial compliance. Similarly, if a paragraph requires that a 
department enforce an efficient process for residents to file 
complaints about police misconduct, the monitor would first ex-
amine whether the department has adopted a policy consistent 
with this requirement. Then, the monitor may audit the com-
plaint process to ensure that the department is actually living 
up to its new internal complaint policy. Only if the monitor 
finds a police agency has satisfied both of these requirements—
that is, both instituted a policy change internally and subse-
quently changed organizational behavior consistent with that 
policy—will the monitor generally find that a department has 
satisfied the paragraph.  
This approach to measuring compliance is logical, but also 
creates openings for confrontation. Police administrators com-
plain that some paragraphs in negotiated settlements are long 
and complex.282 In these cases, a department may be in full 
compliance with virtually all components of the paragraph.283 
Nevertheless, because of the department’s failure to satisfy one 
minor element of the paragraph, the monitor will find that the 
department is not in compliance with the entire paragraph.284 
This can lead to a false appearance that the department is fail-
ing to make progress, when in fact the department is only hav-
ing trouble with a relatively minor part of a large paragraph.285 
Ultimately, measuring compliance is an inexact science that 
puts considerable authority in the hands of external monitors. 
This has led to some questions among stakeholders in the SRL 
process about “[w]ho [m]onitors the [m]onitors?”286  
 
 282. Interview #1, supra note 280, at 9 (“[Y]ou will have one consent para-
graph where you’ll have eight or ten subsets to that paragraph.”).  
 283. Id. at 9–10 (using an example from the Detroit monitoring to explain 
how a department may be in general compliance with virtually all parts of a 
subsection, but still found to not be substantially compliant because of the set-
tlement organization).  
 284. Id. at 10 (recommending that the DOJ make each individual require-
ment a separate paragraph to avoid this problem).  
 285. See, e.g., id. at 9–10 (using Detroit as an example of how the division 
of paragraphs in a consent decree can make measurement difficult and give off 
the false sense that a department is not making progress).  
 286. PERF, supra note 121, at 31 (quoting PERF Executive Director Chuck 
Wexler and giving various responses to this question from ACLU attorney 
Scott Greenwood, DOJ Deputy Section Chief Christy Lopez, Milwaukee Police 
Chief Ed Flynn, and Special Litigation Section Chief Jonathan Smith).  
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The relationship between the monitor and the police agen-
cy also seems to play an important role in the speed of re-
forms.287 For example, one monitor recalled that the particular-
ly contentious relationship between the monitoring team and 
the police administration in Oakland slowed down the progress 
of reforms.288 Conversely, a police administrator in Los Angeles 
described how a monitor’s good working relationship with the 
department helped in jointly crafting policy fixes that directly 
addressed concerns related to the consent decree.289 And as dis-
cussed earlier, stakeholders often disagree on the relative im-
portance of law enforcement experience in the appointment of 
monitors.290  
IV.  BENEFITS OF STRUCTURAL REFORM LITIGATION IN 
POLICE DEPARTMENTS   
Based on interview responses and additional statistical da-
ta, this Article argues that SRL offers four potential ad-
vantages over traditional federal responses to police miscon-
duct. SRL forces municipalities to invest into police reform 
measures that are necessary to reduce unconstitutional mis-
conduct, but may lack local democratic support. The use of ex-
ternal monitoring ensures that officers substantively comply 
with stated mandates. External monitoring also generates ex-
tensive data on frontline officer behavior, thereby enhancing 
transparency and providing opportunities for public accounta-
bility. Once more, SRL provides leadership within police de-
partments with a rare opportunity to enact top-down miscon-
duct reforms without navigating the collective bargaining 
 
 287. See id. at 7 (“The choice of a monitor is extremely important . . . . [be-
cause] [t]hese officials do more than simply ‘monitor’ the progress being made; 
they work to achieve practical and effective outcomes expeditiously.”). 
 288. Interview #16, supra note 148, at 9 (describing the link between the 
“deterioration of the relationship” between the monitor and the police admin-
istration and the slow progress of reforms caused by the subsequent “harsh 
criticism of the chief in one of the reports”); see also Interview #1, supra note 
280, at 8 (describing how Detroit has made progress now that, “four years into 
it,” the monitors have a respectful working relationship with the police de-
partment).  
 289. See, e.g., Interview #6, supra note 281, at 7–8 (explaining how the sol-
id working relationship between the LAPD and its monitor facilitated a collab-
orative effort to jointly write a new policy to satisfy the terms of the consent 
decree).  
 290. See, e.g., Interview #16, supra note 148, at 10 (“I do think the majority 
of monitoring teams should be comprised mostly of people with prior law en-
forcement experience . . . . [a]nd the top monitor should have very high level 
police management experience.”). 
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process. And finally, emerging evidence suggests that SRL may 
actually reduce a police department’s civil liability. This would 
suggest that SRL may actually pay for itself in the long run.  
A. PRIORITIZATION OF POLICE REFORM  
SRL appears to be uniquely successful in part because it 
forces municipalities to prioritize investments into police re-
form over other municipal goals. That is, SRL forces municipal-
ities to allocate scarce resources to the cause of constitutional 
policing, even when doing so may not be democratically popu-
lar. Policing in the United States is highly decentralized. This 
is because of a “conscious design [choice] rather than coinci-
dence.”291 On one hand, decentralization may make local gov-
ernments more democratically accountable and efficient. On 
the other hand, decentralization and permissive state policies 
on incorporation have facilitated the creation of racially and 
economically disparate jurisdictions. When evidence of miscon-
duct arises in a local municipality, these racial and economic 
disparities play a critical role in the local political response. In 
poorer communities, political leaders may not view unconstitu-
tional misconduct as the most pressing local concern. Such a 
municipality may understandably choose not to allocate scarce 
resources to costly police reform, when doing so may take away 
resources from other worthy causes like education. Similarly, in 
racially divided localities, police misconduct that only affects a 
discrete or insular minority group may not be seen as a major 
problem warranting significant attention. In such jurisdictions, 
the political process may even openly approve of police behavior 
that violates the rights of politically powerless groups. Thus, 
decentralization facilitates the existence of some local police 
agencies that harbor patterns of wrongdoing.  
Take the Maricopa County, Arizona, as an example. Joe 
Arpaio has been elected sheriff of Maricopa County for six con-
secutive terms.292 Sheriff Arpaio has received international no-
toriety for his unconventional and legally questionable tac-
tics.293 One of issues that Sheriff Arpaio has emphasized heavily 
 
 291. Erika K. Wilson, Towards a Theory of Equitable Federated Regional-
ism in Public Education, 61 UCLA L. REV., 1416, 1425 (2014). 
 292. Phil Benson, Sheriff Joe Arpaio Sworn in for 6th Term, KPHO NEWS 
(Jan. 6, 2013), http://www.kpho.com/story/20516330/sheriff-joe-arpaio-sworn 
-in-for-6th-term. 
 293. See, e.g., Justice Dep’t To Question Sheriff Joe Arpaio for Civil Rights 
Lawsuit, KTAR NEWS (Feb. 7, 2014), http://ktar.com/22/1698793/Justice-Dept 
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in recent years is the need for local law enforcement to help 
combat undocumented immigration into the United States. But 
before 2005, Sheriff Arpaio admitted that he personally did not 
view undocumented immigration as a “serious legal issue.”294  
It wasn’t until Maricopa County Attorney Andrew Thomas 
won countywide election with the slogan “Stop Illegal Immigra-
tion” that Arpaio’s office began emphasizing the need to crack 
down on undocumented immigrants.295 By all accounts, Sheriff 
Arpaio responded to local community demands and altered his 
enforcement of the law to account for these prerogatives.296 His 
efforts, though, have resulted in ongoing allegations that his 
agency engages in racial profiling297 and regularly fails to inves-
tigate crimes against undocumented immigrants.298 Maricopa 
County’s location near the U.S. border with Mexico, no doubt, 
has affected the tone of the community’s policing demands. And 
even though around 30 percent of the population in Maricopa 
County is Latino,299 the majority of voters have continued to re-
elect Sheriff Arpaio.300  
No doubt, Maricopa County is one of many. When police 
are primarily accountable to local political leaders and majori-
tarian preferences, investments into police misconduct reform 
often fall to the wayside. SRL changes that. Take the LAPD’s 
experience with SRL, which cost an estimated $100 million or 
 
-to-question-Sheriff-Joe-Arpaio-for-civil-rights-lawsuit (describing how the 
DOJ is investigating Arpaio for civil rights violations).  
 294. William Hermann & Edvard Pettersson, Arizona’s Arpaio Testifies 
Race Not Factor in Arrests, BLOOMBERG NEWS (July 24, 2012), http://www 
.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-07-24/-america-s-toughest-sheriff-to 
-answer-profiling-claims.html (quoting Sheriff Arpaio).  
 295. E.J. Montini, Still Doubting Thomas on Immigration, ARIZ. REPUBLIC 
(June 18, 2010), http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/2010/ 
06/18/20100618Montini0618.html (quoting Thomas and describing his use of 
this slogan and issue during his campaign). 
 296. See id. 
 297. See Justice Dep’t To Question Sheriff Joe Arpaio for Civil Rights Law-
suit, supra note 293. 
 298. See Marc Lacey, Arpaio Is Criticized Over Handling of Sex-Crimes 
Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/10/us/ 
sheriff-joe-arpaio-criticized-over-handling-of-sex-crimes-cases.html. 
 299. See Census Transportation Planning Products, AM. ASS’N OF STATE 
HIGHWAY AND TRANSP. OFFICIALS, http://ctpp.transportation.org/Pages/5 
-Year-Data.aspx (follow “take me to the data” hyperlink to access the U.S. 
Census Bureau American Community Survey (2006–2011)) (last visited Mar. 
7, 2015). 
 300. See Elise Foley, Joe Arpaio Defeats Paul Penzone, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/07/joe-arpaio-election_ 
n_2086289.html. 
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more.301 Gaining local political support for such a massive in-
vestment in proactive police reform over a relatively short peri-
od of time would have been extremely challenging without the 
impetus of SRL. But SRL transforms heightened investment in 
the police department from a luxury to a legal necessity. As a 
result, one interview participant suggested that police chiefs in 
cash-strapped cities would be wise to turn to the SRL as a stra-
tegic avenue to force a municipality to dedicate more money to 
fighting misconduct through investments in accountability 
measures.302 To see how SRL can visibly shift municipal in-
vestment into a police department, Figure 6 shows the progres-
sive increase in expenditures per resident by the LAPD, adjust-
ed for inflation, over the SRL era.303  
 
FIGURE 6. LAPD EXPENDITURES PER RESIDENT OVER TIME 




This highlights an inescapable and inconvenient fact—
preventing police misconduct costs money. When local political 
 
 301. See supra Part III.E (describing the details on the cost of the LAPD 
structural reform era).  
 302. Interview #12, supra note 116, at 2 (describing the decision by a mu-
nicipal police chief to invite the DOJ to intervene and provide the department 
with “resources and the expertise” to “take a look and come up with some solu-
tions”). 
 303. The data for Figure 6 comes from the annual reports published by the 
LAPD. These annual reports include measures of total expenditures by the 
LAPD. See Year in Review, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT (1995–2011), 
http://lapdonline.org/year_in_review (last visited Mar. 7, 2015). Figure 6 ad-
justs the expenditures per resident for each year into 2013 dollars using the 
CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STATS., http://www.bls 
.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2015) (full data, with 
breakdowns of expenditures per year, on file with author).  
 304. The vertical line signifies the beginning of the SRL era.  
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actors are unwilling to make the necessary investments in po-
lice reform, SRL uses the threat of equitable relief under 
§ 14141 to force the reallocation of scarce resources in a way 
that no other regulatory mechanism can.  
B. CHANGE IN LEADERSHIP 
The introduction of SRL has also correlated with changes 
in leadership in targeted municipalities. In many cases, the 
start of SRL has ushered in the hiring of an outside, reform-
minded police chief who supports the goals of the federal inter-
vention. In a handful of cases, the municipalities have even 
hired former § 14141 monitors to serve as their police chief dur-
ing SRL. For example, in Seattle, soon after the beginning of 
SRL, Mayor Ed Murray hired Kathleen O’Toole to oversee the 
Seattle Police Department.305 O’Toole had previously worked as 
a § 14141 monitor in East Haven, Connecticut, where a DOJ 
investigation had found a pattern of false arrests, discriminato-
ry policing, and excessive force.306 Similarly, in Los Angeles, 
William Bratton assumed the role as police chief in soon after 
the LAPD came under federal monitoring.307 Before his tenure 
as chief, Bratton had actually served on the monitoring team 
overseeing the LAPD.308 The prospect of federal intervention via 
§ 14141 also correlated with the appointment of new reform-
minded police chiefs in New Orleans309 and Pittsburgh.310  
 
 305. Gene Johnson, Kathleen O’Toole Nominated As Seattle Police Chief, 
WASH. TIMES (May 19, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/ 
may/19/mayor-naming-new-seattle-police-chief. 
 306. Id.  
 307. OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITOR OF THE LOS ANGELES POLICE 
DEPARTMENT, FINAL REPORT FOR LAPD APP. F: TIMELINE OF SIGNIFICANT 
EVENTS 5, available at http://www.keypoint.us.com/Content/PublicReports/ 
LAPD_FINAL-REPORT_Appendix_f_06-11-2009.pdf (reporting, “Mayor Hahn 
selects William J. Bratton to be next Chief of Police” and explaining, “City 
Council confirms him on October 11, 2002, and he is sworn in on October 28, 
2002”). 
 308. FINAL REPORT FOR LAPD, supra note 104, at 5 (identifying Bratton as 
formerly part of the monitoring team overseeing the LAPD before his ap-
pointment as police chief).  
 309. In May of 2014, the same month that the DOJ opened a § 14141 inves-
tigation into the conduct of the New Orleans Police Department, Mayor Mitch 
Landrieu appointed Ronal Serpas to take over the top spot in the department. 
Ted Jackson, Mitch Landrieu Names Nashville Police Chief Ronal Serpas As 
New Orleans’ Top Cop, TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 6, 2010), http://www.nola.com/ 
crime/index.ssf/2010/05/new_orleans_native_ronal_serpa.html. 
 310. Robert McNeilly took over the top spot in the Pittsburgh Bureau of 
Police around the same time that the DOJ began a formal investigation of the 
agency. Chanin, supra note 30, at 117.  
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To be clear, this is not to say that SRL forces any munici-
pality to hire reform-minded leadership. But as one interview 
participant observed, the beginning of a federal investigation 
into a police agency “can’t help [a police chief’s] career.”311 The 
initiation of SRL sends a clear message to local political leaders 
that their police agency is in need of significant changes. Re-
member, numerous interview participants emphasized the im-
portance of supportive leadership in the expeditious completion 
of SRL.312  It should come as no surprise, then, that municipali-
ties facing the prospect of long and expensive federal oversight 
often respond by seeking out a reform-minded leader to oversee 
their police agency during this challenging time.   
C. MANDATORY EXTERNAL MONITORING 
Another apparent advantage of SRL is that, unlike other 
prior regulatory mechanisms, it uses external monitoring to en-
sure that police agencies substantively comply with policy 
changes mandated in negotiated settlements. One way to illus-
trate the value added of this sort of external monitoring is to 
look at how external monitoring has contributed to measure-
able improvement in the LAPD. There, the DOJ had found that 
the LAPD had historically failed to document and investigate 
citizen complaints.313 The consent decree established detailed 
requirements on how the LAPD ought to handle citizen com-
plaints, including requirements that the LAPD complete an ad-
equate investigation, accurately describe the events on internal 
paperwork, forward the complaint to the proper personnel for 
investigation, and give timely notification of the result to the 
complainant.314 SRL gave the LAPD a unique method for test-
ing whether the LAPD had corrected some of the problems as-
sociated with its complaint procedures. The monitors worked 
with the LAPD to audit a sufficiently large, randomized, and 
 
 311. Interview #13, supra note 116, at 5.  
 312. See, e.g., Interview #16, supra note 148, at 7 (describing the slow pace 
of reforms in Oakland and saying that “a lot of that had to do with the dys-
function of our city council and the change in leadership in City Hall, changes 
in direction, all that kind of stuff”); Interview #12, supra note 116, at 7 (saying 
how the most important factor to success is “leadership, stable leadership and 
commitment of that leadership to get it done”); Interview #5, supra note 129, 
at 6 (claiming that “a huge part of the success of these agreements is the lead-
ership”); Interview #7, supra note 147, at 5 (emphasizing the overall im-
portance of leadership). 
 313. See FINAL REPORT FOR LAPD, supra note 104, at 2. 
 314. Id. at 59; see also Los Angeles Consent Decree, supra note 182 (men-
tioning complaint procedures throughout the consent decree).  
RUSHIN_4FMT 4/7/2015  5:27 PM 
1402 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:1343 
 
stratified sample of citizen complaints over time to determine 
whether the LAPD had properly handled these matters in ac-
cordance with the terms of the consent decree.315 Through this 
process, the monitor helped the LAPD “review[] thousands of 
complaint investigations” to ensure that the LAPD was follow-
ing departmental policy.316 The consent decree also required the 
creation of an Audit Unit that sent undercover informants to 
police stations around the city; these informants attempted to 
file complaints and monitor their progress through the com-
plaint system.317 Figure 7 shows the results of these complaint 
process audits.318  
 
 315. FINAL REPORT FOR LAPD, supra note 104, at 103–29 (detailing how 
the LAPD progressed over time in conducting internal audits to ensure that 
officers were engaged in constitutional policing); Los Angeles Consent Decree, 
supra note 182, at 40 (describing the requirement that the LAPD utilize audits 
as part of the consent decree). The consent decree also required the LAPD to 
create a new branch called the Audit Unit that was responsible for conducting 
these independent audits of LAPD behavior on a regular schedule. The moni-
toring team was not always primarily responsible for conducting the regular 
auditing of departmental records. Instead, this responsibility often fell to the 
Audit Unit. The monitoring team, instead, spent considerable time examining 
the quality of these audits to ensure that the newly-created Audit Unit was 
engaged in statistically valid and representative audits. Over time, the moni-
tors found that the Audit Unit substantially improved the quality of its audits. 
These audits found that the LAPD made remarkable progress in fighting un-
constitutional misconduct. FINAL REPORT FOR LAPD, supra note 104, at 109–
12.  
 316. FINAL REPORT FOR LAPD, supra note 104, at 60.   
 317. Los Angeles Consent Decree, supra note 182, at 40 (stating that “the 
City shall develop . . . a plan for organizing and executing regular, targeted, 
and random integrity audit checks, or ‘sting’ operations . . . to identify and in-
vestigate . . . at-risk behavior, including: unlawful stops, searches, sei-
zures . . . , uses of excessive force, . . . [and] to identify officers who discourage 
the filing of a complaint or fail to report misconduct”).  
 318. This data comes from a variety of quarterly reports filed by the LAPD 
monitor between 2001 and 2010. The initial audit for the adequacy of investi-
gations is from 2005, and the final audit is from 2010. See OFFICE OF THE 
INSPECTOR GENERAL, COMPLAINT INVESTIGATIONS AUDIT (FISCAL YEAR 2005–
2006), at ii (Dec. 28, 2005) [hereinafter OIG COMPLAINT AUDIT 2005–2006], 
available at http://www.oiglapd.org/Reports/complt_Invsts_12-28-05.pdf (de-
scribing how in 2005 of the forty-six complaints audited, thirteen gave the Of-
fice of the Inspector General “significant concern related to the adequacy of the 
investigation”); NICOLE C. BERSHON, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, 
COMPLAINT INVESTIGATIONS AUDIT, FISCAL YEAR 2010/2011, at 2–3 (Apr. 13, 
2011) [hereinafter OIG COMPLAINT AUDIT 2010–2011], available at http:// 
www.oiglapd.org/Reports/Compl-A_FY10-11_4-13-11.pdf (showing that 97–
100% of all complaints audited showed that officers conducted proper inter-
views and completed each investigatory step). The initial audit for the com-
pleteness and accuracy of the complaint description happened in 2006 and the 
final audit in 2009. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, COMPLAINT 
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The LAPD demonstrated remarkable and statistically sig-
nificant improvement in its adherence to complaint proce-
dures—achieving nearly perfect compliance by the end of the 
auditing periods in most categories. Given the rigor of the mon-
itor’s audits into the complaint process over the years of SRL, it 
seems likely that the LAPD mostly corrected a problem that 
had plagued the department for years. And it seems likely that 
this impressive improvement was in part because of the pres-
ence of external monitoring. As Professor Rachel Harmon has 
observed, the lack of data on police behavior has made regula-
 
INVESTIGATIONS AUDIT (FISCAL YEAR 2006–2007), at 3 (Dec. 28, 2006) [herein-
after OIG COMPLAINT AUDIT 2006–2007], available at http://www.oiglapd 
.org/Reports/06-Complaint_Audit_12-28-06.pdf (describing how “[e]leven in-
vestigations had a paraphrased statement that was either incomplete or inac-
curately depicted significant information stated in the tape-recorded interview 
of a complainant and/or witness”); OIG COMPLAINT AUDIT 2010–2011, supra at 
2–3 (showing that 100% of all complaints reviewed in 2010 were properly iden-
tified and framed, and 100% were also accurately summarized in writing on 
complaint forms). The initial audit, discussing whether issues were properly 
adjudicated, happened in 2005, with the final audit in 2009. OIG COMPLAINT 
AUDIT 2005–2006, supra at ii (stating that in 2005, ten out of forty-six com-
plaints reviewed, there was some evidence of a significant allegation not 
properly framed or adjudicated); OIG COMPLAINT AUDIT 2010–2011, supra at 3 
(demonstrating that in an audit completed by the Office of the Inspector Gen-
eral, 97% of complaints were found to have reached a reasonable adjudicatory 
result). The initial audit for the proper forwarding of complaints occurred in 
2001 with the final audit happening in 2006. FINAL REPORT FOR LAPD, supra 
note 104, at 50–51 (showing the change over time in the complaint face sheet 
review). And finally, the first audit testing whether complainants were noti-
fied of the results of the complaint happened in 2002, with the final audit 
handed down in 2006. Id. at 62 (showing in figure entitled “Notification to 
Complainant” the progressive improvement in this category). 
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tion and oversight difficult throughout American history.319 By 
mandating external monitoring, SRL addresses this problem by 
creating an extensive amount of publicly available data on po-
lice behavior, thereby increasing transparency and accountabil-
ity.320  
D. LEGAL COVER FOR TOP-DOWN REFORMS 
SRL also appears to be uniquely successful because it pro-
vides police chiefs with legal cover to implement top-down re-
forms. The DOJ’s involvement imbues these reforms with legal 
and constitutional significance, which increases the probability 
of frontline officer buy-in. And perhaps even more importantly, 
SRL allows some municipalities to implement dramatic mis-
conduct reforms without navigating the traditional collective 
bargaining process.321 The majority of states require depart-
ments to bargain with police unions before imposing new poli-
cies that may affect any term or condition of employment.322 
The result is that law enforcement executives are often unable 
to implement radical reforms, even if they may be necessary to 
address serious misconduct issues within the department.323 As 
Professor Harmon has argued, “[c]ollective bargaining . . . func-
tions like an immediate tax” on misconduct reforms.324   
SRL increases the feasibility of accountability mechanisms 
that might be otherwise thwarted by the collective bargaining 
process. In multiple occasions, courts have prevented police un-
ions from blocking SRL efforts on collective bargaining 
grounds. In Los Angeles, for example, the court prevented an 
attempt by the local police union to intervene and block negoti-
ated settlements reached via § 14141.325 In Washington, D.C., 
 
 319. See generally Rachel Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data on Polic-
ing?, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 1119 (2013) (explaining how, throughout American his-
tory, policymakers have not had the necessary data to regulate and oversee 
police effectively).  
 320. See supra Part III.E (discussing how monitoring creates publicly 
available quarterly reports, filled with data on police behavior).  
 321. See supra Part III.B.  
 322. Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 
799 (2012).  
 323. Other scholars have also discussed how collective bargaining affects 
police departments. See, e.g., Seth W. Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of 
Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179, 2205–17 (2014).  
 324. Harmon, supra note 322.  
 325. See supra Part III.B (describing how police unions have attempted to 
intervene, mostly unsuccessfully, into SRL litigation under collective bargain-
ing grounds).  
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the police union filed an Unfair Labor Practice Complaint chal-
lenging the introduction of an early warning system and addi-
tional record keeping.326 But this complaint “went nowhere.”327 
This underscores an uncomfortable reality in the law of polic-
ing. Sometimes, demands by police unions via collective bar-
gaining agreements run counter to the need for external over-
sight and accountability.   
As Professor Clyde Summers argued, “[t]he special political 
structure and procedure of collective bargaining is particularly 
appropriate for decisions where [public] employees’ interests in 
increased wages and reduced work load run counter to the 
combined interests of taxpayers and users of public services.”328 
As examples, Professor Summers identified “wages, insurance, 
pensions, sick leave, length of work week, overtime pay, vaca-
tions, and holidays” as topics that were “proper subjects for 
bargaining.”329 But “[d]emands by policemen for disciplinary 
procedures which effectively foreclose use of a public review 
board further illustrate the need to examine each subject to de-
termine whether it should be decided [by] collective bargain-
ing.”330  
This is not to say that SRL works best when police unions 
are excluded entirely from the negotiation process. In other 
cases like Cincinnati, the terms of the negotiated settlement re-
flected an unprecedented collaboration between the local police 
union, police leadership, the DOJ, and community stakehold-
ers.331 Scholars like Professor Kami Chavis Simmons have per-
suasively argued that this sort of collaborative approach can 
improve SRL and increase the probability of political and or-
ganizational buy in.332 Instead, what seems to make SRL effec-
tive is its apparent ability to elevate the importance of over-
sight and accountability relative to other considerations.  
 
 326. Chanin, supra note 30, at 50.  
 327. Id.  
 328. Clyde W. Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspec-
tive, 83 YALE L.J. 1156, 1194 (1974).  
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. at 1196.  
 331. Chanin, supra note 30, at 56 (“With the help of a special master and a 
Magistrate Judge, [U.S. District Court Judge Susan] Dlott used an unprece-
dented form of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) to bring together the 
plaintiff class, the police department, and the local chapter of the [Fraternal 
Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge 1].”).  
 332. Simmons, supra note 65, at 518–19 (advocating for measures to in-
crease collaboration during federal reforms). 
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E. REDUCED CIVIL LIABILITY 
Finally, interview participants suggested that SRL helps 
departments reduce their civil liability. As one participant with 
inside knowledge about the Detroit Police Department re-
marked, “the amount of money that we have saved on lawsuits 
that we had endured for years . . . have paid for the cost of im-
plementation of the monitoring two or three times” over.333 
Measuring the extent to which SRL can reduce civil liability is 
difficult. Interviewees suggested that many municipalities do 
not keep thorough records on civil rights payouts.334 But at least 
one department, the LAPD, did disclose a complete dataset of 
all civil liability related to police conduct during the SRL era.335 
Figure 8 shows the trend in the number of lawsuits levied 
against the LAPD for civil rights violations from 2002 to 
2006.336   
 
 
 333. Interview #20, supra note 24, at 7.  
 334. See generally Interviews #1–30 (on file with author). 
 335. This data comes from a comprehensive list of all lawsuits and payouts 
made by the LAPD and released to the Los Angeles Times. See Legal Payouts 
in LAPD Lawsuits, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2012), http:// 
spreadsheets.latimes.com/lapd-settlements. This data shows all suits settled 
between January 1, 2002, and October 5, 2011. When reporting the infor-
mation to the Los Angeles Times, the LAPD categorized each case based on 
the type of lawsuit. Thus, many of these suits involved employment litigation, 
including claims of wrongful termination, sexual harassment, and the like. 
This figure only uses lawsuit data from this spreadsheet in cases where the 
LAPD categorized it as either a civil rights violation case or a use of force re-
lated case. These are the kinds of misconduct that the consent decree should 
have reduced. This resulted in a set of 353 civil rights lawsuits against the 
LAPD between 2002 and 2011. These civil rights or use of force cases took an 
average of 486 days to settle, or about 1.33 years. And twenty-four of these 
cases took over three years to settle. Of course, litigation can take years to 
complete. A claim filed in 2001 may not be resolved until 2002 or 2003. Thus, 
while the dataset runs through 2011, the figure ends at the year 2006. This is 
to ensure that the data takes into account the length of time it takes to settle 
civil rights lawsuits. The final dataset may slightly underrepresent the num-
ber of civil rights suits filed in 2006 and the expected payoff. Some suits filed 
in 2006 may still be unsettled as of October 5, 2011—approximately 1,749 
days later. But based on the full dataset provided by the LAPD, 346 out of 353 
suits (or about 98%) were settled in less than 1,749 days (data on file with au-
thor).  
 336. Id. (listing all lawsuits and payouts by LAPD over this time period). 
See supra note 335 for methodology used to create this figure.  
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FIGURE 8. NUMBER OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND USE OF FORCE 





To be clear, the LAPD data is imperfect and preliminary. 
Data from before 2002 was unavailable at the time of this pub-
lication. Such data would have been particularly useful in de-
termining whether this apparent decline in civil rights suits is 
merely a continuation of a trend that existed before SRL, or 
whether it was uniquely associated with the introduction of 
SRL. In the future, more analysis will be needed over a longer 
period of time and in more cities to verify this hypothesis. But 
the limited data is encouraging. It suggests the total number of 
civil rights claims filed against the LAPD that resulted in pay-
outs declined over the SRL era. The total payouts for civil 
rights suits based on the date of filing also decreased from 
$13,187,100 in 2002 to $3,325,054 in 2006.337 This suggests 
that, even though SRL is expensive,338 it may ultimately pay for 
itself through decreased litigation costs.339  
While this trend is consistent with a conclusion that SRL 
contributes to lower civil liability, it could also be consistent 
 
 337. See supra note 335 for methodology used to create this figure. 
 338. The total cost of the SRL in Los Angeles was approximately $100 mil-
lion. See supra notes 271–74.  
 339. The LAPD spent around $17,477,740 to settle civil rights suits filed in 
2001, and $13,187,100 to settle civil rights suits in 2002. By 2008 and 2009, 
these numbers fell to $2,194,729 and $626,599. It is not difficult to imagine 
these types of yearly savings quickly adding up to pay for the high initial cost 
of SRL. See supra note 335 (full dataset on file with author).  
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with a change in litigation strategy, independent of the intro-
duction of SRL. If a change in litigation strategy was driving 
the decline in civil rights lawsuits resulting in financial pay-
outs, this change in strategy should presumably have similar 
effects on other types of lawsuits against the LAPD. For exam-
ple, if a change in litigation strategy was driving this decline, 
we might expect to see a similar decline in LAPD suits result-
ing in payouts for other matters, like traffic accidents. Never-
theless, the number of successful lawsuits against the LAPD 
for other matters, like traffic accidents, has remained relatively 
constant during the SRL era.340 This is consistent with the con-
clusion that SRL exerted a unique and significant influence on 
the volume of civil rights abuses by the LAPD, which may have 
resulted in a reduction in civil liability.  
V.  LIMITATIONS OF STRUCTURAL REFORM LITIGATION   
Although SRL offers several advantages over other tradi-
tional regulatory methods, it also comes with some possible 
drawbacks. Since local municipalities must bear the brunt of 
the high cost of SRL, there remain questions about the feasibil-
ity of this regulatory approach in poorer communities. Ques-
tions have also recently emerged about the sustainability of 
these costly reforms. Some critics have alleged that SRL causes 
officers to become less aggressive, thereby contributing to high-
er crime. Additionally, the federal government only has the re-
sources to pursue SRL in a small fraction of the municipalities 
where there appears to be a pattern or practice of misconduct. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there are significant 
questions about whether SRL can forcefully transform a police 
agency where local political leaders and police executives op-
pose the intervention.  
A. HIGH COST AND MUNICIPAL INEQUALITY 
Decentralization in American policing leads to wide re-
source disparities between municipalities.341 The result is that 
 
 340. In 2003, private litigants filed thirty-seven civil suits related to traffic 
accidents against the LAPD that eventually resulted in a monetary payout. In 
the years that followed, the number of traffic-related civil suits filed against 
the LAPD that resulted in financial compensation remained stable—always 
between thirty-three and fifty-nine cases. See Legal Payouts in LAPD Law-
suits, supra note 335.  
 341. Several decades ago, estimates put the number of policing agencies at 
around 40,000. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 28, at 
91. Subsequent studies have reduced this number substantially. Modern esti-
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some jurisdictions lack the necessary resources to invest in pol-
icies in procedures to reduce misconduct.342 While the forced al-
location of scarce resources may be an advantage of SRL, it also 
represents a potential limitation. What happens, after all, 
when a particularly poor community chooses not to invest in 
costly, proactive police reforms out of necessity because of a 
lack of overall resources? Take a community like Camden, New 
Jersey. Over a third of all Camden residents are living below 
the poverty line.343 The entire City of Camden took in only 
around $24 million in tax revenue in 2011, despite the fact that 
the Camden police force alone cost around $65 million that 
year.344 Camden has historically lacked the resources to hire 
enough police forces to man the streets, let alone to invest in 
proactive misconduct regulation mechanisms. When faced with 
the prospect of SRL, other financially strapped communities 
like New Orleans have been forced to increase municipal taxes 
substantially.345 As a result, the DOJ may understandably face 
significant backlash in using SRL in cash-strapped communi-
ties. 
 
mates place the number at around 17,985 state and local law enforcement 
agencies in the United States. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 2. 
 342. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 28, at 91 
(highlighting how spending for urban departments was found to be around 
$27.31 per resident per year, while spending in smaller departments was only 
$8.74 per resident per year).  
 343. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 15. 
 344. Matt Taibbi, Apocalypse, New Jersey: A Dispatch from America’s Most 
Desperate Town, ROLLING STONE (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.rollingstone.com/ 
culture/news/apocalypse-new-jersey-a-dispatch-from-americas-most-desperate-
town-20131211. Camden has responded to this budgetary crisis by consolidat-
ing its police department with the county-level agency to lower costs and avoid 
duplicative expenditures. See Heather Haddon & Ricardo Kaulessar, Crime 
Dips in Camden as New County Police Force Replaces City Officers, WALL ST. 
J. (Aug. 5, 2013), available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424127887323968704578650171849946106 (detailing the so-called 
“experiment” whereby Camden has closed its city-wide police department and 
instead relied on the newly expanded county department).   
 345. Richard Rainey, Mitch Landrieu Requests a Doubling of Tax Rates for 
New Orleans Police and Fire, TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 1, 2014), 
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/05/mitch_landrieus_tax_hike_plan
.html; Tyler Bridges, Legislature Approves Property Tax Hike for New Orleans 
Police and Fire; Now Heads to Voters, LENS (May 29, 2014), http:// 
thelensnola.org/2014/05/29/legislature-approves-property-tax-hike-for-new 
-orleans-police-now-heads-to-voters.  
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B. SUSTAINABILITY OF REFORMS 
Serious questions also remain about the ability of a police 
department to sustain reforms made during federal interven-
tion after the monitoring ends. The Pittsburgh case provides a 
cautionary tale about what can happen after external monitor-
ing ends. The Pittsburgh Bureau of Police was the nation’s first 
police agency to reach a § 14141 settlement with the DOJ on 
April 16, 1997.346 Both external monitoring and independent 
evaluation by the Vera Institute for Justice demonstrated that 
the Bureau made substantial progress in reducing apparent 
unconstitutional misconduct during SRL.347 The DOJ ended 
oversight of Pittsburgh around June 16, 2005.348 During this 
entire period, Police Chief Robert McNeilly oversaw the Bu-
reau.349 Throughout his time as Chief, McNeilly was an ardent 
supporter of the DOJ intervention, claiming that the changes 
mandated by the consent decree all “mirrored his own plans” 
for the agency.350 This resulted in fierce backlash by frontline 
officers. When McNeilly received voter approval to create a Cit-
izens Police Review Board, “which holds hearings on police 
misconduct and can recommend disciplinary action,” the police 
union issued a vote of no confidence in McNeilly’s leadership.351 
Despite this sort of opposition, McNeilly pressed ahead with 
implementing each requirement of the negotiated § 14141 set-
tlement, including a computerized early warning system.352 
Throughout this time, Mayor Thomas Murphy, Jr. generally 
 
 346. Rushin, supra note 14, at 3247. 
 347. See generally DAVIS ET AL., supra note 30. 
 348. Rushin, supra note 14, at 3247. 
 349. Michael A. Fuoco, The Mayoral Transition: Police Chief Out, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Dec. 29, 2005), http://www.post-gazette.com/local/ 
city/2005/12/29/The-mayoral-transition-Police-chief-out/stories/ 
200512290284 (stating how Chief McNeilly was sworn in on April 2, 1996 and 
was removed around December 29, 2005).  
 350. See Michael A. Fuoco, Police Chief McNeilly’s Tenure Saw Wrenching 
Changes, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Jan. 9, 2006), http://www.post-gazette 
.com/local/city/2006/01/09/Police-chief-McNeilly-s-tenure-saw-wrenching 
-changes/stories/200601090107.  
 351. Id. (explaining how the Fraternal Order of Police, the local police un-
ion that represents the Pittsburgh Police Bureau, issued this order during the 
consent decree time period).  
 352. Id. (describing a “computerized early-warning system that analyzes all 
aspects of an officer’s job performance so that hints of trouble can be detected 
and dealt with quickly”).  
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supported Chief McNeilly and the ongoing federal interven-
tion.353   
In 2006, when Pittsburgh elected Robert O’Connor, Jr. to 
replace Mayor Murphy, things changed.354 Mayor O’Connor 
fired Chief McNeilly and sided with local police union leaders, 
who claimed that McNeilly’s use of excessive disciplinary action 
hurt officer morale.355 In the years since this change in leader-
ship, civil rights advocates have worried that the Bureau “is 
now sliding back toward where it was” before federal interven-
tion.356 During federal oversight, for example, the number of 
civil rights complaints against the Pittsburgh police brought to 
the ALCU fell dramatically.357 In the years after McNeilly’s re-
moval, the volume of these complaints has increased.358   
Perhaps most troubling of all, current Pittsburgh Mayor 
Bill Peduto recently acknowledged that the Bureau had re-
gressed so much that it may be “on the verge of another consent 
decree.”359 This latest problem has emerged after Pittsburgh Po-
lice Chief Nathan Harper was indicted in March of 2013 on cor-
ruption charges, which spurred another federal investigation of 
the agency.360 The entire Pittsburgh story demonstrates how 
quickly reforms can unravel without institutional support. 
More research, though, is needed to understand the extent to 
which § 14141 reforms are sustained after federal intervention 
ends.   
 
 353. Id. 
 354. Fuoco, supra note 349.  
 355. Fuoco, supra note 350 (describing the change in philosophies under 
the new mayoral administration).  
 356. Laura Maggi, Pittsburgh Bureau of Police Was First in Nation With 
Official Federal Intervention, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Oct. 16, 2011), http://www 
.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2011/10/pittsburgh_bureau_of_police_wa.html.  
 357. Id.  
 358. Id.  
 359. Jeffrey Benzing, Pittsburgh Police Could Face Second Federal Consent 
Decree, Peduto Says, PUBLICSOURCE (July 1, 2014), http://publicsource.org/ 
from-the-source/pittsburgh-police-could-face-second-federal-consent-decree 
-peduto-says.  
 360. Jonathan D. Silver, Liz Navratil, & Rich Lord, Attorney: Ex-Pittsburgh 
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C. DE-POLICING EFFECT 
Various critics have claimed that federal intervention into 
the affairs of local police agencies contributes to de-policing—
that is, SRL decreases police efficiency or aggressiveness, 
thereby increasing crime.361 Perhaps the most common argu-
ment made by de-policing advocates is that SRL will decrease 
police aggressiveness.362 According to this view, SRL reduces 
the amount of encounters between police and citizenry, either 
because SRL makes officers hesitant, or because it forces offic-
ers to spend valuable time completing procedural hurdles.363 
Some officers suggest that de-policing is most likely to affect 
the number of police contacts and arrests for minor street 
crimes.364 This is because arrests for serious crimes normally 
happen after lengthy investigations, while arrests for minor 
crimes happen via police officers proactively monitoring the 
streets and responding to visible wrongdoing. The de-policing 
hypothesis suggests that policies and procedures mandated by 
SRL inhibit an officer’s abilities to engage in this type of proac-
tive, order maintenance policing. As a result, some worry that 
SRL will lead to higher crime rates.365 As one officer in a police 
 
 361. See, e.g., Colleen Long, NYC Stop-and-Frisk Policy Wrongfully Target-
ed Minorities, Judge Rules; Outside Monitor Appointed, STAR TRIB. (Aug. 12, 
2013), http://www.startribune.com/219252341.html (identifying Mayor Bloom-
berg as a strong critic of a federal district court decision to overhaul the New 
York City Police Department’s stop-and-frisk program, and citing Bloomberg’s 
concern that the law will hurt crime-fighting efforts); Saul, supra note 30 (also 
quoting Mayor Bloomberg criticizing the court decision overhauling stop-and-
frisk in part because of the court’s failure to understand the streets of the 
city).  
 362. See, e.g., DAVIS ET AL., supra note 30, at 16 (explaining how officers in 
Pittsburgh felt “hesitant to intervene in situations involving conflict because 
they were afraid of having a citizen file an unwarranted anonymous complaint 
against them”).  
 363 See, e.g., Chanin, supra note 30, at 185 (quoting a leader from the 
Washington, D.C. Police Union saying that SRL leads to more time-consuming 
paperwork). 
 364. STONE ET AL., supra note 92, at 19–20 (showing in Figure 10 that a 
high proportion of LAPD officers believed that the threat of community com-
plaints would hurt proactive street policing; also stating that “concerns have 
been raised that the consent decree would lead to de-policing or what one law 
enforcement official describe[d] to us as the ‘drive-and-wave syndrome’”). 
 365. Perhaps the most prominent recent example of this de-policing hy-
pothesis was the response by Mayor Michael Bloomberg to the New York City 
stop-and-frisk litigation. On August 12, 2013, U.S. District Judge Shira 
Scheindlin ruled that the New York City stop-and-frisk program constituted a 
“policy of indirect racial profiling.” Goldstein, supra note 14. As part of her de-
cision, Judge Scheindlin ordered the appointment of an external monitor to 
oversee the reform of the stop-and-frisk policy. Daniel Beekman, Ivy League 
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agency undergoing SRL explained, “I think the decree limited 
officers’ ability to perform their jobs. And criminals know this 
and take advantage.”366 Two other officers backed up this claim, 
arguing that because of the introduction of federal intervention, 
some “officers quit pulling over cars” while others became less 
“aggressive with people who are breaking the law” because of 
fear that “people will complain of their civil rights being violat-
ed.”367 
Despite these consistent concerns about de-policing, evi-
dence for the hypothesis is limited. Property crime rates in 
communities undergoing SRL, like Washington, D.C.,368 Los 
Angeles,369 Cincinnati,370 and Prince George’s County,371 all 
dropped more than the national average. Only in Pittsburgh 
 
Law Professors To Help Implement Stop-and-Frisk Reforms, N.Y. DAILY NEWS 
(Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/ivy-league-law 
-professors-implement-stop-and-frisk-reforms-article-1.1459589. Mayor Mi-
chael Bloomberg strongly objected to this decision, calling it a “terrible idea” 
and arguing that it would be “disruptive.” Goodman, supra note 14; see also 
Yoav Gonen, De Blasio Calls NYPD’s Federal Monitor a “Temporary Reality,” 
N.Y. POST (Sept. 20, 2013), http://nypost.com/2013/09/20/de-blasio-calls-nypds 
-federal-monitor-a-temporary-reality (referring to Bloomberg’s conclusion that 
the appointment of a monitor would be “terrible”). Citing Philadelphia’s expe-
rience with a police department monitor, Bloomberg claimed that the decision 
could contribute to higher crime, thereby putting the safety of all New Yorkers 
at risk. Goodman, supra note 14. New York City officials are pointing to a thir-
teen percent increase in shootings over twenty-eight days as evidence that the 
Judge’s orders contributed to higher crime. Damien Gayle, Shootings Up 13% 
in New York City After Federal Judge Rules Police “Stop and Frisk” Tactics 
Unconstitutional and Racist, DAILY MAIL (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www 
.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2425055/Shootings-10-New-York 
-City-federal-judge-rules-stop-search-unconstitutional-racist.html. 
 366. DAVIS ET AL., supra note 30, at 22.  
 367. Id. at 19–20.  
 368. SRL started in Washington, D.C., on June 13, 2001, and it ended on 
February 10, 2008. Rushin, supra note 14, at 3247 (showing in Appendix B the 
dates for all negotiated settlements pursuant to § 14141). During that time, 
property crime rates fell by 22.42% in Washington, D.C., and 21.84% nation-
wide. See Uniform Crime Reports, supra note 97. 
 369. SRL started in Los Angeles on June 15, 2001, and concluded on May 
16, 2013. Rushin, supra note 14, at 3247. During that time, property crime 
rates fell by 37.68% in Los Angeles and 21.84% nationwide. See Uniform 
Crime Reports, supra note 97. 
 370. SRL started in Cincinnati on April 12, 2002, and concluded on April 
12, 2007. Rushin, supra note 14, at 3247. During that time, property crime 
rates fell by 14.31% in Cincinnati and 9.76% nationwide. See Uniform Crime 
Reports, supra note 97. 
 371. SRL started in Prince George’s County on January 22, 2004, and end-
ed on March 5, 2005. Rushin, supra note 14, at 3247. During that time, prop-
erty crime rates fell by 36.62% in Prince George’s County and 13.45% nation-
wide. See Uniform Crime Reports, supra note 97. 
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did property crime rates decrease less than the national aver-
age during SRL.372 Overall, property crime rates fell by an av-
erage of 12.9% more than the national average in municipali-
ties targeted for SRL.373 The same pattern holds true for violent 
crime rates. Rates of violent crimes in targeted agencies fell by 
an average of 36.29% more than the national average.374  
The available evidence also suggests that arrest and non-
violent arrest, when controlling for the number of officers and 
the number of arrest opportunities, actually increased by an 
average of 22.1% and 40.12% respectively across municipalities 
facing SRL.375 Evidence on traffic stop data and citizen contact 
data also cuts against the de-policing hypothesis. In Pittsburgh, 
the introduction of SRL did not correlate with any apparent re-
ductions in traffic citations or DUI arrests.376 In Los Angeles, 
the number of pedestrian and car stops per officer increased by 
35.2% during SRL.377   
 
 372. SRL started in Pittsburgh on April 16, 1997, and ended on June 16, 
2005. Rushin, supra note 14, at 3247. During that time, property crime rates 
fell by 6.10% in Pittsburgh and 20.50% nationwide. See Uniform Crime Re-
ports, supra note 97. 
 373. This calculation is a weighted average. Since each municipality differs 
substantially in size, larger municipalities like Los Angeles were weighted 
more heavily in calculating this average. Each municipality was weighted rel-
ative to its population in the 2000 census.  
 374. Using the same basic methodology used above, supra notes 368–73, 
these five departments saw violent crime rates decrease by a weighted average 
of 36.29%, relative to the national average. See Rushin, supra note 14, at 3247; 
Uniform Crime Reports, supra note 97. 
 375. To calculate changes in arrest rates, this study first calculated the 
change in total arrest and non-violent arrest per officer in each municipality 
during its SRL era. This was then compared to the change in arrest opportuni-
ties, defined as the percentage change in the number of reported crimes in 
each jurisdiction. The difference between these two numbers represents the 
change in arrests, controlling for the number of officers and arrest opportuni-
ties. To calculate the weighted average of this change across the five munici-
palities, this study used the same basic methodology used above, supra notes 
368–373, to weight each department by population.  
 376. DAVIS ET AL., supra note 85, at 56 fig.12 (showing the progression of 
these two trends during the SRL era).  
 377. See L.A. POLICE DEP’T, STATISTICAL DIGEST (2001–2011), available at 
http://www.lapdonline.org/crime_mapping_and_compstat/content_basic_view/ 
9098 (click on “Statistical Digest” hyperlink under the requisite year) (provid-
ing the number of serious, or type I arrests, and the number of minor, or type 
II, arrests for 2001 and 2011 in Los Angeles); Uniform Crime Reports, supra 
note 97 (click on requisite year under “Crime in the United States” hyperlink; 
then click “Go to Police Employee Data Tables” hyperlink; then click “Table 
78” hyperlink; then click “California” hyperlink and navigate to the data for 
Los Angeles). For pedestrian and vehicle stops, I used 2002 to represent the 
start of SRL, since it was the first date that there was good data available. I 
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This is not to say that SRL may not contribute to some 
type of de-policing. It is fully possible that § 14141 intervention 
leads to more complex externalities that are not readily appar-
ent from these statistics.378 This short discussion only scratches 
the surface of potential causal mechanisms at work across the-
se various municipalities. But ultimately, given the limited ev-
idence presented here, the de-policing hypothesis remains just 
that—a hypothesis in need of more nuanced empirical evalua-
tion.  
D. LIMITED FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT 
Another potential drawback of § 14141 is that the federal 
government simply lacks the resources necessary for aggressive 
enforcement. Remember that the DOJ has only investigated 
around three police agencies each year pursuant to § 14141.379 
To compensate for this limitation, the DOJ has seemingly pri-
oritized the investigation of major police agencies that serve 
large swaths of the American population—the New York City 
Police Department, the Los Angeles Police Department, the 
New Jersey State Police, the Illinois State Police, Maricopa 
County Sheriff’s Department, Prince George’s County Police 
Department, the Seattle Police Department, and the Albuquer-
que Police Department, just to name a few.380 While this is an 
understandable enforcement approach, various interviewees 
with experience working § 14141 cases expressed frustration 
that the DOJ lacked the resources to push forward with SRL in 
many cases that they felt warranted DOJ intervention.381  
 
used 2008 as the end date for motor vehicle and pedestrian stops since it was 
the most recent date when the LAPD released thorough data.  
 378. For instance, it remains possible that SRL reduces total police con-
tacts via Terry stops or traffic stops. Measuring this sort of a reduction is chal-
lenging. In many cases, municipalities do not, or have not, kept good records 
on the number of these minor interactions with law enforcement. Thus, mak-
ing accurate determinations regarding changes in the rate of these minor con-
tacts over time is often impossible. It is also possible that additional causal 
factors have independently influenced the apparent aggressiveness of police 
and crime rates in these municipalities, which is hiding the potential de-
policing effect of these reforms.  
 379. See supra Part III.A. 
 380. Rushin, supra note 14, at 3244–46 (showing in Appendix A the list of 
all cities that have been subject to a DOJ investigation pursuant to § 14141).  
 381. See, e.g., Interview #12, supra note 116, at 3 (“I think it was a combi-
nation of factors, political, pragmatic and evidentiary. Because there are lim-
ited resources, the department didn’t have, when I was there and certainly 
doesn’t have now, resources to investigate every place where there might be a 
factual predicate that would merit it.”); Telephone Interview with DOJ Partic-
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As one former DOJ litigator complained, “I can tell you . . . 
that there are far more agencies that . . . have some sort of a 
problem of constitutional dimensions than we would ever get 
to.”382 Of course, less than optimal enforcement is common in 
virtually any regulatory arena. Nevertheless, given that there 
are around 18,000 local and state police agencies in the United 
States, the likelihood that any one agency will be subject to 
federal intervention in a given year appears to be relatively 
low. Or as a DOJ litigator bluntly put it, “even if 0.1% of [law 
enforcement agencies] have an issue, that’s more than we’ve 
ever done in the entire history of the statute.”383 
E. NEED FOR LOCAL SUPPORT 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, nearly every single 
interview participant suggested that the supportiveness of the 
police executives and local political leaders in the targeted de-
partments was the single greatest predictor of the overall suc-
cess of the reforms.384 Participants pointed to Oakland as an 
example of a case where departmental leadership has not al-
ways supported the ongoing SRL efforts.385 Perhaps not coinci-
dentally, SRL has dragged on at a painfully slow rate in Oak-
land.386 Police chiefs that have embraced the structural reform 
efforts have had an easier time implementing the changes ex-
 
ipant #15, at 5 (July 31, 2013) [hereinafter Interview #15] (on file with author) 
(stating that “the leadership of the section and the leadership of the division 
have to make judgments about how to allocate resources and what things to 
pursue”). 
 382. Interview #5, supra note 129, at 1.  
 383. Id.  
 384. See, e.g., Interview #16, supra note 148, at 7 (describing the slow pace 
of reforms in Oakland and saying that “a lot of that had to do with the dys-
function of our city council and the change in leadership in City Hall . . . 
[c]hanges in direction . . . [a]ll that kind of stuff”); Interview #12, supra note 
116, at 7 (noting the importance of “leadership, stable leadership and com-
mitment of that leadership to get it done”); Interview #5, supra note 129, at 6 
(claiming that “a huge part of the success of these agreements is the leader-
ship”); Interview #7, supra note 147, at 5 (emphasizing the overall importance 
of leadership). 
 385. Interview #12, supra note 116, at 6 (explaining how Oakland leader-
ship within the department and within the broader city government has ebbed 
and flowed and how this likely had some effect on the consent decree imple-
mentation).  
 386. Henry K. Lee, Oakland Police Slammed for Slow Pace of Reform, S.F. 
GATE (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Oakland-police 
-slammed-for-slow-pace-of-reform-2594489.php (describing the complaints 
about the slow speed of reform in the Oakland Police Department).  
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peditiously.387 Interviewees emphasized that supportive leader-
ship was necessary if a department was to change its organiza-
tional culture.388 This is particularly relevant since scholars 
have increasingly tied misconduct within a police department 
to underlying trends in organizational culture.389  
While not surprising, this realization has significant impli-
cations for the usefulness of SRL as a regulatory mechanism. It 
suggests that SRL is not a silver bullet. SRL ultimately re-
quires local cooperation and dedication to succeed. The DOJ 
cannot use SRL to instantly transform a police agency with de-
fiant, obstinate leadership. At the start of the Obama Admin-
istration, Assistant Attorney General Thomas Perez “told a 
conference of police chiefs . . . that the Justice Department 
would be pursuing ‘pattern or practice’ takeovers of police de-
partments much more aggressively than it did under the Bush 
Administration, eschewing negotiation in favor of hardball tac-
tics seeking immediate federal control.”390 During the second 
half of the George W. Bush Administration, the DOJ took a 
more cautious approach to enforcing § 14141, opting for cooper-
ative arrangements as opposed to hostile takeovers of local po-
lice agencies.391 Policing scholars criticized this Bush Admin-
istration approach, saying that it demonstrated a lack of 
political commitment to the issue of police misconduct.392 The 
evidence gathered in this study raises questions about whether 
the DOJ can effectively use § 14141 in a manner that the 
Obama Administration has advocated.  
Can the DOJ force reform on a municipality that adamant-
ly opposes it? This represents that most important question fac-
 
 387. Interview #13, supra note 116, at 9 (giving advice to any chief whose 
department was under SRL that he or she ought to “welcome it with open 
arms and make it a positive experience because if you become perceived as 
part of the solution instead of part of the problem, you’ll survive . . . . And if 
you’re not part of the solution, you’ll definitely be a casualty”).  
 388. Telephone Interview with External Monitor #11, at 9 (July 1, 2013) 
(transcript on file with author) (stating that organizational leaders and com-
manders play a pivotal role in transforming organizational culture within a 
police department).  
 389. See, e.g., Armacost, supra note 10 (generally tying organizational cul-
ture of a police department to police misconduct).  
 390. Heather Mac Donald, Targeting the Police, WKLY. STANDARD, Jan. 31, 
2011, at 26. 
 391. Rushin, supra note 14, at 3228–35.  
 392. Harmon, supra note 13, at 21 (explaining the “absence of political 
commitment to § 14141 suits, especially on the part of the Bush Administra-
tion”).    
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ing SRL in the future. The answer will define the future use-
fulness of this regulatory mechanism. Thus far, the DOJ has 
not fully pursued SRL against municipalities that ardently op-
pose federal oversight. In fact, on occasion, municipalities have 
requested DOJ intervention via § 14141.393 At least one pending 
§ 14141 case in Alamance County, North Carolina may test the 
limits of SRL. There, a DOJ investigation found that the Ala-
mance County Sheriff Department, headed by Sheriff Terry 
Johnson, was engaged in a pattern or practice of racial profiling 
and discrimination.394 But unlike other municipalities that 
quickly initiated negotiations with the DOJ behind closed doors 
to settle the potential § 14141 suit, Sheriff Johnson called the 
DOJ report an “embarrassment” and vowed to fight the issue in 
court.395 Alamance County could represent two firsts—the first 
time a municipality brings a § 14141 case to trial and the first 
time that the DOJ attempts to force reform on a department 
with openly intransigent leadership. The results from the case 
may speak volumes about SRL’s future usefulness.   
VI.  AVENUES FOR FUTURE REFORM   
While potentially useful in accelerating organizational 
change, SRL will never be the primary mechanisms for deter-
ring police wrongdoing. The process is long and expensive,396 
and the federal government only has the resources to initiate a 
small number of cases each year.397 Nevertheless, the findings 
from this study suggest several possible avenues for future po-
lice reform.   
First, given the empirical evidence that SRL can effectively 
reduce patterns and practices of misconduct, there is a strong 
argument for increasing the number of SRL cases each year. To 
be clear, SRL is not perfect. As discussed, it suffers from sever-
 
 393. Rushin, supra note 14, at 3223–24 (describing how whistleblowers 
within a department can spur DOJ action, including when a police executive 
encourages federal intervention).  
 394. Brennan McGovern, DOJ Files Civil Rights Suit Against Alamance 
County Sheriff, ELON LOC. NEWS (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.elonlocalnews 
.com/2012/12/doj-files-civil-rights-suit-against-alamance-county-sheriff.  
 395. Id.  
 396. See supra Part III.D–E (showing in Figures 7 and 8 the approximate 
cost of monitoring and the potentially long monitoring period associated with 
SRL).  
 397. See supra Part II.A (explaining how the DOJ only has the resources to 
investigate an average of about three local police agencies each year, and push 
forward with SRL against around one agency annually).  
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al limitations. Despite these limitations, though, SRL appears 
to have several advantages over other legal arrangements at 
bringing about organizational change in a police department. 
Outside of increasing federal funding for § 14141 enforcement, 
one way to increase the number of SRL cases would be for state 
legislatures to pass statutes that authorize state attorneys gen-
eral to initiate SRL. Any state statute could roughly mirror 
§ 14141 and give state attorneys general the ability to bring 
suit against police departments within their state that are en-
gaged in a pattern and practice of unconstitutional misconduct. 
At least one state, New York, already has a statute that gives 
the state attorney general the ability to initiate this sort of pat-
tern or practice litigation against police departments.398 And 
Professor Samuel Walker and Morgan Macdonald have previ-
ously offered a template for such a state-level SRL measure.399  
Second, policymakers could use the lessons from SRL to 
craft more effective legal regulations of law enforcement. One 
lesson from the success of SRL is police reform efforts are costly 
to implement. One of the benefits of SRL is that it forces mu-
nicipalities to prioritize police reform.400 Police reform, after all, 
is often expensive. Given the considerable decentralization of 
American law enforcement, though, questions remain about 
whether poorer municipalities could afford the high upfront 
costs of SRL.401 This presents a strong argument for state and 
federal subsidization of police reforms aimed at curbing mis-
conduct. Such an approach would potentially address resource 
inequality created by decentralization. For example, a state 
government could subsidize the implementation of proactive 
accountability measures like early information systems in local 
police agencies. The federal government could also play a more 
substantial role in directly subsidizing many of the important 
misconduct reforms included in a typical § 14141 settlement.402 
 
 398. The New York Attorney General has already previously utilized New 
York Executive Law § 63(12) to justify state-level SRL. See New York v. Town 
of Wallkill, 01-Civ-0364 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2006) (final judgment).  
 399 . See generally Walker & Macdonald, supra note 46, at 549 (going on to 
explain that “the democratic process ensures that the public interest weighs 
heavily on the actions of each state attorney general”).   
 400. See supra Part IV.A.  
 401. See supra Part V.A. 
 402. Currently, dozens of federal statutes permit federal agencies to give 
resources to local police departments. Most of this funding is allocated to help 
enlarge municipal police forces, assist local police in addressing specific public 
safety threats, and facilitate inter-jurisdictional coordination. See generally 
Rachel Harmon, Federal Public Safety Programs and the Real Cost of Policing 
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But simply throwing money at the problem of police misconduct 
is not enough. 
Another lesson from structural police reform is that, in ad-
dition to subsidizing the cost of police reform, the law needs to 
provide mechanisms for external accountability of frontline of-
ficers. SRL works in part because it uses external monitoring, 
which ensures that frontline officers substantively, rather than 
symbolically, comply with stated requirements.403 These moni-
tors come from outside the department, preventing them from 
being influenced by local political forces. External monitoring 
during SRL also results in the accumulation of copious 
amounts of data on frontline officer behavior.404 This data al-
lows outsiders to make more accurate judgments about the po-
lice department’s compliance with constitutional norms. Previ-
ous legal regulations of police agencies have been criticized in 
part because they provide broad mandates, but do little to en-
sure that police officers actually comply with stated guide-
lines.405 Local police behavior is also notoriously difficult to 
judge because most agencies collect little data on officer behav-
ior.406 This is a testament to the importance of external ac-
countability and accurate data collection in the legal regulation 
of law enforcement. It would be impractical for every police 
agency in the country to hire an external, court appointed mon-
itor to oversee police behavior and collect data on officer behav-
ior. But there are other ways that the law can force external 
accountability on police agencies. States and the federal gov-
ernment could mandate more data collection on frontline officer 
behavior.407 Technology could also be a valuable tool to increase 
 
(July 14, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Generally, the-
se federal grants come with few conditions. Id. at 16. While inter-jurisdictional 
coordination and crime control are valuable goals, the evidence from this study 
suggests that the top-down subsidization of misconduct regulations may also 
be helpful. 
 403. See supra Part III.E (describing the value of monitoring).  
 404. See supra Part III (chronicling all of the data collected by the LAPD 
monitor). 
 405. See supra Part I.A (showing how previous attempts to regulate law 
enforcement were often ineffective because they could not force police depart-
ments to adopt substantive policies to address misconduct).  
 406. Harmon, supra note 323, at 797 n.139 (“Unfortunately, data about po-
lice misconduct and its remedies are presently too limited to say how well con-
stitutional remedies deter.”). 
 407. For an example of this, see the recent federal mandate that police de-
partments collect additional data on race and police behavior. Emily Badger, 
Why It’s So Hard To Study Racial Profiling by Police, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/04/30/it-is 
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oversight in an efficient and cost-effective manner. One way is 
through the mandated use of video surveillance, like body cam-
eras, to monitor frontline officer behavior. Some municipalities 
have already integrated such technological oversight.408 
A final lesson from SRL relates to the occasional tension 
between collective bargaining agreements and the ongoing need 
for officer accountability. Interview participants suggested that 
one of the benefits of SRL is that it elevates the importance of 
misconduct reforms relative to other legal considerations.409 In 
practice, this allowed SRL to push forward the implementation 
of accountability mechanisms like early information systems, 
over the objection of organized labor.410 The efforts by collective 
bargaining units to block these accountability measures high-
lights an important way that collective bargaining laws can 
sometimes unintentionally impede necessary police misconduct 
reform.411 No doubt, collective bargaining can serve an im-
portant purpose in ensuring fair work conditions and compen-
sation for police officers.412 Even so, the lessons from SRL rein-
force the need for states to make careful determinations about 
which topics are appropriate for collective bargaining. 
  CONCLUSION   
SRL provides the federal government with a unique oppor-
tunity to force local police agencies to adopt invasive and costly 
reforms aimed at curbing misconduct. Because of this, legal 
scholars have long been optimistic that SRL could become one 
 
-exceptionally-hard-to-get-good-data-on-racial-bias-in-policing (explaining how 
the Justice Department announced plans to collect data on race and police 
stops, searches, arrests, and case outcomes).  
 408. See, e.g., Jim Mustian, Body Cameras To Record All NOPD Public In-
teractions, NEW ORLEANS ADVOC. (Apr. 7, 2014), http://www 
.theneworleansadvocate.com/home/8799320-172/body-cameras-to-record-all; 
Briana Bierschbach, Police Departments in Minnesota Focus in on Body Cam-
eras, MINNPOST (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/ 
2014/01/police-departments-minnesota-focus-body-cameras; Jay Kolls, Minne-
apolis Police To Use Body Cameras as Early as September, KSTP 5 EYE 
WITNESS NEWS (July 8, 2014), http://kstp.com/article/stories/s3496391.shtml.  
 409. See supra Part IV.C (describing how SRL gives police chiefs legal cov-
er to implement unpopular reform over union objections without navigating 
the collective bargaining process).  
 410. See supra Part IV.D (discussing how SRL has successfully overcome 
challenges by collective bargaining groups to the implementation of EIS sys-
tems and other similar procedures).  
 411. See, e.g., Stoughton, supra note 323, at 2216–17 (discussing how col-
lective bargaining laws incidentally impact misconduct regulations). 
 412. Summers, supra note 328, at 1194. 
RUSHIN_4FMT 4/7/2015  5:27 PM 
1422 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:1343 
 
of the most important tools for addressing police misconduct. 
The available empirical evidence suggests that SRL has been 
an effective tool for reducing misconduct in several police agen-
cies. This is in part because SRL uses external monitoring to 
ensure organizational compliance. SRL can also force munici-
palities to allocate scarce resources to the cause of police re-
form. In doing so, this regulatory mechanism appears to give 
police leadership in targeted agencies the necessary legal cover 
to implement potentially unpopular reforms. The available evi-
dence also suggests that SRL has even reduced some agencies’ 
civil liability. Even so, SRL is not perfect. The process is long 
and costly. Questions remain about the sustainability of re-
forms after monitoring ends. Critics also allege that SRL con-
tributes to de-policing. Ultimately, SRL requires institutional 
and political support within a municipality to succeed. This 
raises unanswered questions about whether this regulatory 
mechanism can force reform on a municipality that adamantly 
opposes it. In the end, SRL will never be the primary mecha-
nism for addressing police wrongdoing. Even so, policymakers 
can use the lessons from SRL to craft more effective legal regu-
lations of law enforcement in the future.  
 
